2013 Annual Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner
Section 1
Introduction
1.1
This report is rather differently presented, both in its form and some of its content,
from recent reports of my predecessors.
1.2
My first aim is to fulfil my statutory obligation for 2013 to report annually to the
Prime Minister. My second aim is to address, so far as I am able in a report to be laid
before Parliament, public concerns relevant to my statutory function raised by media
publications based on disclosures reportedly made during 2013 as a result of Edward
Snowden’s actions.
1.3
Some of these disclosures have related to alleged interception activities of UK
intelligence agencies. They have suggested that these agencies have, or may have,
misused their interception powers or capabilities. It was plain that I should investigate
these suggestions thoroughly, which I now have.
1.4
Public concern has centred on potential intrusive invasion of privacy. Such concern
has been expressed publicly in the United States, Europe and other countries with greater
force perhaps than in the UK. But unjustified and disproportionate invasion of privacy
by a public authority in the UK would breach Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights just as much here as in other parts of the European Union.
1.5
Concerns of this kind are legitimately raised and need to be addressed. They
derive to a significant extent from a lack of detailed understanding of the legislation which
enables lawful interception of communications to take place; and a lack of information
about what the interception agencies actually do or, just as importantly, what they do
not do.
1.6
I have very considerable sympathy with those who are hazy about the details
of the legislation. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA 2000) is a
difficult statute to understand. An important change of presentation in this report is that
I shall give a narrative outline of the relevant statutory provisions in what I hope will be
a reasonably accessible form with an eye to the disclosures. Because RIPA 2000 Part I is
difficult legislation, this narrative may in places be dense and perhaps itself indigestible.
I have tried to make it as accessible as possible, but apologise if I have not entirely
achieved this.
1.7
It is not so easy to give a relevant public account of what the interception agencies
actually do because much of it is sensitive. In this report, I am constrained by statutory
provisions forbidding disclosure. But an important change of presentation in this report
is that I shall try to be more informative than my predecessors felt they needed to be.
To this end, I am not submitting any suggested Confidential Annex to this report to the
Prime Minister1. I do not consider that a confidential annex is presently necessary. That
does not mean that one may not be needed in the future.
1.8
I have included at the end of each of the main Sections of the report “Points of
Note” which summarise highlights of the contents of those Sections.
1 It is strictly for the Prime Minister to decide which parts of this report should be made public by laying
them before Parliament – see section 58(7) of RIPA 2000.
1