Section 6 Questions of Concern
41
1.
Does the Interception of Communications Commissioner have full access to
all information from the public authorities sufficient for him to be able to
undertake his statutory functions?
41
2.
Does the Interception of Communications Commissioner have sufficient
resources to perform his statutory functions fully? And does he do so
sufficiently for public purposes?
41
3.
Is the Interception of Communications Commissioner fully independent of the
government and the public authorities?
43
4.
Should the Interception of Communications Commissioner be more open in
communicating with the public?
44
5.
Is RIPA 2000 Part I fit for its required purpose in the developing internet age?
45
6.
Do the interception agencies misuse their powers under RIPA 2000 Part I
Chapter I to engage in random mass intrusion into the private affairs of law
abiding UK citizens who have no actual or reasonably suspected involvement
in terrorism or serious crime? If the answer to that question is no, is there any
material risk that they or somebody might be able to intrude in this way?
56
7.
How can the public feel comfortable in the matter of interception when
everything is secret and the public does not know and cannot find out what
the interception agencies are doing?
61
8.
Do British intelligence agencies receive from US agencies intercept material
about British citizens which could not lawfully be acquired by intercept in the
UK and vice versa and thereby circumvent domestic oversight regimes?
62
Points of Note
63
Section 7 Prisons
65
Background
65
Authorisations to Intercept Prisoners Communications
66
Inspection Regime
67
Inspection Findings and Recommendations
68
Points of Note
72
Appendix 1: Decision of the IPT about section 8(4) of RIPA 2000
74
Annex A: Public Authorities with access to Communications Data
76
Annex B: Total Notices & Authorisation for each Public Authority
78
Annex C: Budget
82