2013 Annual Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner
one) resulted in part from a visit by the Committee to the SPoC unit of the Metropolitan
Police, when Committee members were able to see how the system works in practice. I
have myself visited and inspected the SPoC unit of the Metropolitan Police. I share the
Joint Committee’s published view as to the integrity of the SPoC system.
6.5.17 Possibility of abuse. It is necessary to consider the possibility of intentional,
malign abuse of this Part I Chapter II system resulting in invasion of privacy.
6.5.18 I do not believe that small scale abuse of this kind can be absolutely ruled out.
It would probably have to entail a forged application by or with the criminal connivance
of an individual SPoC. I do not believe that very small scale abuse of this kind could be
guarded against absolutely except conceivably by the installation of very sophisticated
protective computer and management systems whose expense would probably not
be justified by the risk. A risk of this kind would not be eliminated by changing the
authorisation process.
6.5.19 I do not believe that a criminal conspiracy of this kind of any significant scale
would happen or go undetected in properly trained professional organisations of palpable
integrity with carefully constructed internal processes and safeguards.
6.5.20 Summary. I do not believe that RIPA 2000 Part I Chapter II now permits intrusion
into privacy to any greater extent than when the legislation was enacted in 2000. Increases
in volume have not affected the integrity of the system. Nor has the increase in volume
and sophistication of the internet. Obtaining internet communications data under
Chapter II is intrinsically the same operation as obtaining more traditional telephony
communications data. The statutory principles remain to be applied in the same way. As
has been said, RIPA 2000 is technology neutral.
Section 8(1) Interception Warrants
6.5.21 Procedure for Interception Warrants. This is provided for in sections 5 to 11 of
RIPA 2000 Part I Chapter I and the Code of Practice for the Interception of Communications.
The essential features of the application process are included in paragraphs 3.11 to 3.21
of this report.
6.5.22 General Safeguards. Section 15 of RIPA 2000 provides for important restrictions
on the use of intercepted material. It is an explicit part of my statutory functions under
section 57 to keep under review the adequacy of the safeguard arrangements which
section 15 imposes on the Secretary of State. This in the main requires a review of the
safeguarding procedures which the interception agencies operate.
integral part of the RIPA request process … It is our view that the SPoC service should be made a statutory
requirement for all authorities which have access to communications data.”
48