2013 Annual Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner
6.5.13 Internal authorisation. An important feature of the system for communications
data approval is that, with the exception of those for local authorities which are now
authorised by a relevant judicial authority10, it is internal to the public authority wishing
to acquire the communications data. This is in contrast with warrants authorising
interception of content which are issued by a Secretary of State. This no doubt is an
indication of a parliamentary perception when RIPA 2000 was enacted that intercepting
content was potentially more intrusive than acquiring communications data.
6.5.14 A view might be taken that giving authority to acquire communications data
internally is unsatisfactory. That view might be strengthened if the inspections which my
office undertakes revealed abuse or significant unlawful use of the Part I Chapter II powers.
Our inspections do not reveal this. The errors which are reported or uncovered by the
inspectors (see paragraphs 4.45 to 4.54) are certainly errors requiring better training or
system adjustments in places. But they are numerically very small in relation to the whole
and do not significantly detract from the integrity of this part of the statutory scheme.
6.5.15 Safeguards. Safeguards against abuse include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
the requirement that acquiring communications data must be necessary for
one of the Part I Chapter II statutory purposes. Acquiring it for any other
purpose would be unlawful;
the fact that each application has to be made individually in writing and contain
written material explaining why each element of the statutory requirements
is fulfilled;
the scrutiny required to be undertaken by the trained SPoCs;
the consideration required of the (usually independent) DP of the necessity
and proportionality of the individual applications;
the fact that all public authorities which acquire larger volumes of
communications data are now inspected annually by our inspectors;
the fact that we obtain data from CSPs to audit that their disclosures correlate
with the public authorities’ approvals.
6.5.16 In 2012, there was parliamentary scrutiny of the draft Communications Data Bill
by a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament and by the Intelligence Services
Committee11. The Joint Committee considered whether the Part I Chapter II system for
acquiring communications data remained appropriate. I understand that, in the early
stages of its scrutiny, the Joint Committee (or some of its members) were inclined to think
that the system of internal authorisation might no longer be appropriate. However, the
Committee’s eventual report gave broad approval to the existing statutory system and
in particular to the SPoC system12. I understand that this change of view (if there was
10 See section 23A of RIPA inserted by amendment by section 37 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.
11 Draft Communications Data Bill Session 2012/13 – HL Paper 79, HC 479; The Intelligence and Security’s
report in February 2013 “Access to communications data by the intelligence and security agencies” Cm
8514.
12 See paragraph 179 of the Report on the Draft Communications Data Bill (HC/479) “The SPoC system is an
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