6.30.
The case studies also indicate that bulk acquisition may provide a more accurate
result than targeted techniques, for example when the SIAs need to identify one
phone among many candidates. Targeting each phone not only involves
intrusion into the lives of phone users, many of whom will be of no intelligence
interest at all, but also carries a greater risk that the right phone will not be
identified at all. Although few details can be given in public, A9/15 illustrates this
point.
6.31.
The SIAs told the Review team that targeted alternatives (to bulk acquisition and
other bulk powers) would often be more time-consuming and costly. A9/6
provides an example. We pressed for more details, and MI5 provided the
following response:
“Where alternatives to bulk capabilities exist, it is difficult if not impossible to
say precisely how much additional resource, cost and time would have been
required to obtain similar intelligence. At any one time, MI5 is likely to be
running several hundred ICT [international counter-terrorism] investigations.
MI5 (and SIS, GCHQ and the police) constantly prioritise resource across the
breadth of our casework. The alternative combination of resources available
(collection capabilities, numbers of investigators and analysts) and the speed
in which they might have generated similar intelligence therefore depends not
only on the specifics of the case, but also the wider threat picture and
associated balance of resource being used to manage the risk at any one
time.”
6.32.
While I cannot reach any firm conclusions about the level of cost or amount of
time involved in the use of alternatives, it is obvious that some alternatives –
such as round-the-clock surveillance, or a request to CSPs for data relating to
dozens of phones, followed by analysis of that data – will cost more than a
search being conducted in a matter of hours by a single analyst of bulk
acquisition data. They may also be more intrusive.
6.33.
Liberty submitted to the Review that the examples in the open Operational Case
do not justify the use of bulk acquisition. It claims that the same results could
have been obtained in some of the cases through the use of targeted
techniques, in particular contact chaining, and that other examples provide
insufficient detail for analysis.
6.34.
On the latter point (only), I agree. The Review team had the substantial
advantage of being given far more details of these cases than were made
available in the Operational Case. But it was apparent to me that, in these
cases, targeted means would not have been adequate alternatives. In some,
MI5 did not have sufficient information to form the basis of a targeted approach.
In others, a targeted request would not have provided the crucial information, or
would have been too slow to be effective.
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