6.26.
I was curious as to whether the disadvantages of querying multiple databases
(extra time, and greater difficulty in undertaking complex analysis) could be
removed by the use of the filtering arrangements provided for in clauses 63-65 of
the Bill. Those arrangements are promoted by the Government as “an additional
safeguard .. to prevent data from being provided to public authorities that is not
relevant to the request”.222 But when a parliamentary committee looked at the
idea of a request filter in 2012, it concluded that as well as minimising collateral
intrusion, “the request filter will speed up complex enquiries”.223 NGOs and
others have sought to portray the arrangements as akin to merging separate
databases into one.224 If filtering arrangements ever become capable of
emulating a single database, it could be argued that the comparative advantage
of aggregating the data in one place would disappear.
6.27.
I pursued this point with the Home Office officials entrusted with developing the
filtering arrangements, who told me that they were still at the stage of defining
requirements before going to the design phase. Its scope was uncertain, and
there would be practical difficulties in bridging different formats. A prototype
would have to be engineered, and a pilot phase operated. It was clear that a
request filter will not be fully operational in the short term. Even when
operational, it seemed doubtful whether it could fully emulate the characteristics
of a single database.
6.28.
For the time being at least, there are thus no filtering arrangements that could
present an adequate alternative to the bulk acquisition power. But the matter
needs to be kept under consideration. I return to this theme in chapter 9 below.
Other techniques
6.29.
Within some of the case studies, MI5 itself identified potential alternatives. In
many instances, those alternatives would have been more intrusive than the use
of bulk acquisition, and that higher level of intrusion would have affected not only
targeted individuals but entirely innocent members of the public. A9/14, a case
in which MI5 needed to monitor terrorists who met in a place used by other
people, provides a striking example: one alternative to bulk acquisition would
have involved increased surveillance of members of the group. A further
alternative of monitoring the meeting place would have involved an unacceptable
level of intrusion into the lives of people completely unconnected to the targets.
222
223
224
Factsheet – request filter (published alongside the draft Bill in November 2015).
Joint Committee on the draft Communications Data Bill, Report of December 2012, HL Paper
79 HC 479, para 126.
E.g. K. Fiveash, “UK Govt sneaks citizen database aka ‘request filters’ into proposed internet
super-spy law”, The Register, 4 November 2015: an interpretation strongly contested by the
Government.
98