16. In previous years my annual report has received some, albeit not
extensive, coverage in the press. This reporting has concentrated almost
exclusively on my references to errors which have taken place in the course of
the year as opposed to the many positive aspects of my report. I think that this is
a pity, bearing in mind that the positive aspects of my report so far outweigh the
negative aspects.
The Extent of Interception: General
17. As in the past, the Annex to this Report contains a summary of the
numbers of warrants in force at the end of 2002 and those issued throughout the
course of the year by the Home Secretary and the Scottish First Minister. The
great majority of warrants issued in England and Wales and Scotland remain
related to the prevention and detection of serious crime. The continuing
incidence of serious and organised crime and an increased facility to counter it
are the main cause of the larger numbers of warrants. The significantly high
level of warrants sought each year, with a corresponding level of workload for
the Secretaries of State and on the part of the relevant agencies, clearly calls for
the exercise of vigilant supervision. I can report that the level of scrutiny has
been, and continues to be, generally well maintained. Although the number of
errors reported to me during 2002 is slightly lower than that recorded in my
Report last year, I still remain concerned about its level. It is inevitable that in
any detailed, technical human activity errors may occur. Nevertheless I have
impressed on the agencies the need to eliminate errors or, at least, to reduce
them to an absolute minimum. The agencies are very aware of the importance
of this, and on each occasion where an error has occurred they review their
procedures with a view to ensuring that the same error does not recur. Keeping
errors to a minimum is one of the reasons for having safeguards in place. I will,
of course, continue to monitor the system to satisfy myself that every effort is
being made to prevent such recurrences and seeking full explanations if they
do.
Safeguards
18. Sections 15 and 16 of RIPA lay a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure
that arrangements are in force as safeguards in relation to the dissemination,
disclosure, copying, storage and destruction etc., of intercepted material. These
sections of the legislation require careful and detailed safeguards to be drafted
by each of the agencies and for those safeguards to be approved by the
Secretary of State. This has been done. As I mentioned in my last Report I have
been impressed by the care with which these documents have been drawn up.
My advice and approval was sought for the documents and I am approached to
agree amendments to the safeguards when they are updated in light of technical
and administrative developments.
19. During 2002 the Home Office began working on updating the Handbook
for Communication Service Providers (CSPs). I contributed to this process by
providing both a few suggested guidelines on what should be covered in the
section on safeguards and advice on the obligations that should be placed on
the CSPs for the purpose of facilitating my carrying out of the functions as
Commissioner.
20. I cannot emphasise enough that the sections 15 and 16 requirements are
very important. Those involved in the interception process are well aware of
the invasive nature of this work and care is taken to ensure that intrusions of
privacy are kept to the minimum. I am satisfied that the agencies are operating
effectively within their safeguards.
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