care that they take to satisfy themselves that the warrants are necessary for the
authorised purposes. If the Secretary of State has any doubts about the
application and is minded to refuse it, further information or clarification
would be sought so that reconsideration is given to issuing or renewing a
warrant. Outright refusal of an application is comparatively rare because of the
care with which applications are prepared by the agency concerned and
scrutinised by the senior officials in the Secretary of State’s department before
they are submitted to him. However, I view the occurrence of occasional
outright refusals, where for example, the strict requirements of necessity and
proportionality are not met in the opinion of the Secretary of State, as a healthy
sign. It shows that the Secretaries of State do not act as a “rubber stamp”.
10. During 2002 I also visited the communications service providers (CSPs),
that is to say the Post Office and major telephone companies. Each of the CSPs
employs personnel who are engaged solely on the execution of interception of
communications warrants. They have acquired expertise in their field and,
again, in the course of my visits, I was impressed by the care, interest and
dedication of these employees to their work in this sensitive area and with their
understanding of the need at all times to comply with the safeguards imposed
on them.
11. During the course of the year I attended, together with the Intelligence
Services Commissioner, upon the Intelligence and Security Committee’s
Conference Dinner and, on separate occasions, upon the Australian InspectorGeneral and the Secretary to the Joint Intelligence Committee, to discuss
matters of mutual interest and concern.
12. I also met, without the Intelligence Services Commissioner, the Director
of Public Prosecutions and the Director of Casework at the Crown Prosecution
Service to discuss legal issues associated with RIPA. In addition I was briefed
by the new National Technical Assistance Centre (NTAC) on its history, aims
and functions and I provided them with some observations on their draft
safeguards document, which they were happy to accept.
13. In February 2002, at the request of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), I
paid a short visit to Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad to discuss the question of
legislation governing the interception of communications with representatives
of the governments, senior officials, members of the judiciary and others in
those countries. I believe that this visit was welcomed and fruitful. It was
followed up successfully by members of the legal department of SIS.
14. In my Report last year I highlighted the possible suspicions that some
members of the public may have that their telephone conversations are being
unlawfully intercepted by the security, intelligence or law enforcement
agencies. Through all aspects of my oversight work I am as satisfied as it is
possible to be that deliberate unlawful interception of communications of the
citizen does not take place. I say “deliberate” because on rare occasions
technical errors do occur which may render an interception unlawful in which
case the product, if any has been received, from the interception is always
destroyed.
15. By law, the interception of an individual’s communications can take place
only after a Secretary of State has granted a warrant and the warrant can be
granted on strictly limited grounds as set out in section 5 of RIPA, essentially in
the interests of national security and the prevention and detection of serious
crime. Of course, it would theoretically be possible to circumvent this
procedure, but there are extensive safeguards in place to ensure that this cannot
happen, and I am satisfied that it does not. I consider it an important part of my
oversight role to ensure that these safeguards are in place and that they are
observed.
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