remove the remaining two telephone numbers which remained targeted for a
further three months. Five calls were intercepted during this period though none
were listened to and all have been deleted from GCHQ’s systems. GCHQ have
revised their procedures to help prevent a recurrence.
48. The Security Service reported four errors. Brief details of two of these are
highlighted below. The first case relates to an intercept of an email address. When
a warrant against a target was cancelled one of the email addresses was omitted.
The error was an oversight on the part of a desk officer. Security Service officers
have been reminded of the importance of keeping accurate records and of
carrying out thorough checks of the telephone numbers and addresses listed on
the interception warrants prior to their cancellation.
49. In another error, the Security Service processed a modification to add a new
mobile telephone number to an existing warrant. Unfortunately the submission
with the new telephone number included an incorrect case identifier. The case
identifier quoted had previously been allocated to a different mobile number of a
different target. This resulted in the wrong telephone number being intercepted.
No product was obtained and there was no interference with privacy. Security
Service officers have been reminded of the importance of carrying out thorough
checks of telephone numbers added to interception warrants.
50. HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) reported two errors, one of which I
have highlighted. HMRC made an application for a modification to the schedule
to add another telephone number for a warranted target; the modification was
authorised and interception commenced. However, concern was expressed about
the lack of product. A check revealed that HMRC’s application showed an
incorrect digit in the telephone number. Interception ceased immediately: as
already mentioned no product was received. HMRC has amended its system to
strengthen the independent accuracy checks.
51. The Serious Organised Crime Agency reported one error where the
warrant number for a renewal was incorrectly quoted in a submission to the Home
Office. Consequently interception continued on the wrong warrant number. A
month later a modification on the correct warrant number for the addition of a
telephone number was submitted. A check of all the warrantry paperwork
identified the error and the facilities were immediately suspended. I understand a
new IT system at SOCA will prevent a recurrence of such an error and that all
staff working in the Home Office have been reminded of the importance of
keeping accurate records and of carrying out thorough checks.
52. I now turn to give two examples of the four errors made by the
communications service providers (CSPs).
53. The first error, reported by the Police Service of Northern Ireland, occurred
when a warrant was cancelled and the CSP was notified but continued to provide
product to a sharing agency for a further six weeks. This was as a result of an
administrative error at the CSP.
54. The second error, reported by an internet service provider (ISP) themselves,
occurred in respect of two warrants that the ISP was instructed to set up by the
Home Office. Unfortunately due to a misunderstanding at the ISP, the results of
these two warrants were delivered to the wrong agency. Discussions between the
ISP and the Home Office have addressed the misunderstanding and no such
future error should recur.
55. No errors were reported by the Home Office, Scottish Executive, Ministry
of Defence, Secret Intelligence Service and Metropolitan Police Special
Branch.
RIPA Part I Chapter II: Acquisition and disclosure of communications data
56. All Public Authorities have a duty to report any errors which occur when
they are acquiring communications data under Section 5 of the draft Code of
Practice. They are obliged to provide an explanation for the errors and most
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