Safeguards
41. Sections 15 and 16 of RIPA lay a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure
that arrangements are in force as safeguards in relation to the dissemination,
disclosing, copying, storage and destruction etc., of intercepted material. These
sections of the legislation require careful and detailed safeguards to be drafted by
each of the agencies and for those safeguards to be approved by the Secretary of
State. This has been done. My advice is sought on proposed amendments to the
safeguards when they are updated in light of technical and administrative
developments. During the period of this report I saw and commented on the
revised handling arrangements for the Scottish Police Service and the safeguards
for the new Serious Organised Crime Agency.
Errors
RIPA Part I Chapter I: Interception
42. Twenty-four interception errors and breaches have been reported to me
during the course of the 9 month period of this report. This reflects a significant
decrease in the errors reported by my predecessor. That said I still consider the
number of errors to be too high. By way of example, details of some of these
errors are recorded below. It is very important from the point of view of the public
that I stress that none of the breaches or errors were deliberate, that all were
caused by human error or procedural error or by technical problems and that in
every case either no interception took place or, if there was interception, the
product was destroyed immediately on discovery of the error. The most common
cause of error tends to be the simple transposition of numbers by mistake e.g.,
1965 instead of 1956. The examples that I give are typical of the totality and are
anonymous so far as the targets are concerned. Full details of all the errors and
breaches are set out in the Confidential Annex.
43. The Northern Ireland Office/Police Service Northern Ireland reported
seven errors of which five are highlighted below. In two separate cases, warrants
were properly obtained against their respective targets but product revealed that
the telephone numbers quoted on the warrants were incorrect and that the
telephones were not, in fact, used by the intended targets. All product was
destroyed.
44. In three other separate cases, the telephone numbers on their respective
warrants contained incorrect digits. In one of the cases, no product was obtained:
in the other two the product was destroyed. In all cases, the correct numbers were
added to their respective warrants.
45. Six errors were reported to me by GCHQ of which three are highlighted
below. The first case occurred in relation to a request made of GCHQ. A target
whose communications were being intercepted because he was expected to have
travelled overseas was found to have remained in the United Kingdom, the
individual having not travelled as expected. The target’s change of plans was
reported to GCHQ who failed to take any action upon the information received.
No items were intercepted. All personnel have been reminded of the need for care
and vigilance in following through information received.
46. The second error occurred in relation to a request made of GCHQ to
intercept the communications of four individuals whilst they were overseas. The
targets travelled overseas and their expected date of return was reported to GCHQ
who were expected to cease targeting on that day. Unfortunately, it was not
terminated until the day after their return. Only one item was intercepted but not
transcribed or reported. All analysts have been reminded of the correct procedures
to follow when a target is found to be in the UK.
47. In the third, and separate, case, four telephone numbers were added to
GCHQ’s databases to intercept the communications of a target who was known to
be overseas. One number was subsequently removed and another was removed
when analysts learned that he had re-entered the UK. However, analysts failed to
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