Surveillance by intelligence services – Volume II: field perspectives and legal update
Table 1:
Oversight framework: main actors and scope of control
Who?/What?
Efficiency
Fundamental
rights
protection
Financial
integrity and
rigour
Parliament
Oversight
committee
Oversight
committee
Oversight
committee
& Inquiry
commission
Inquiry
commission
Financial
Commission
Judge
-
Yes
-
Yes
Supreme Court
of Auditors
Independent
bodies
Expert bodies
and State Secrets
control body
Expert bodies
Expert bodies
Expert bodies,
DPA, ombuds
institutions
Special bodies
Watchdogs
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Notes:
The red line indicates the focus of FRA’s research.
Source:
Cousseran, J.-C. and Hayez, P. (2015), p. 292; adapted by FRA, 2017
8.1. Diversity of oversight
mandates
Table 1 shows that the different oversight bodies within
an oversight framework have varying purposes, with
individual actors focusing on different aspects of the
services’ functioning. Actors with specifically limited
mandates, such as supreme audit institutions, focus
on a single task. Others’ mandate requires them to
undertake broader oversight and assess different
aspects. Coordination is therefore needed.
FRA’s research focused on two main aspects: legality –
a core task of expert bodies – and fundamental
rights protection. The review of intelligence policies
is indirectly covered, as well. This report does not
address the supervision of intelligence services’
efficiency, given that this is only indirectly related
to fundamental rights safeguards and would require
data on surveillance techniques that are confidential.
Similarly, this report does not analyse the role of
supreme audit institutions, although these are very
important for ensuring the financial integrity of, and
rigour regarding, public money expenditures.236
236 For more information on SAIs, see, for example: Born, H. and
Wills, A. (eds.) (2012), pp. 166-175.
64
Policy /
specific threats
Legality
Scrutinising intelligence services’ finances
The Swedish National Audit Office (Riksrevisionen), mandated by parliament to audit all state finances, issued
a report in 2015 on ‘the control of the defence intelligence
operations’. The 64-page document addresses four overarching questions: 1) has the government created preconditions for effective control?; 2) is the control conducted
effectively?; 3) are the findings of the control reported to
the controlled entities and the government?; and 4) are
issues raised by the controlling authorities acted upon?
While the assessment is generally positive, it also calls
for some improvements. For instance, the report states
that the State Defence Intelligence Commission (Statens inspektion för försvarsunderrättelseverksamheten,
SIUN) should be more explicit in its communications with
controlled agencies on needed changes and also better
document its control methodologies.
Swedish National Audit Office (2015), ‘The control of the defence intelligence
operations’
In terms of financial supervision over intelligence
services, for example, in Germany and France,
parliaments adopted original solutions to supervise the
services’ expenditures in addition to the specialised
budget commissions and the Federal Court of Auditors
(Bundesrechnungshof) and the French Court of Auditors
(Cour des comptes), respectively.