8
Oversight framework
of intelligence services
UN good practices on oversight institutions
Practice 6. Intelligence services are overseen by a combination of internal, executive, parliamentary, judicial and
specialised oversight institutions whose mandates and
powers are based on publicly available law. An effective system of intelligence oversight includes at least one
civilian institution independent of both the intelligence
services and the executive. The combined remit of oversight institutions covers all aspects of the work of intelligence services, including their compliance with the law;
the effectiveness and efficiency of their activities; their
finances; and their administrative practices.
UN, Human Rights Council (2010), Report of the Special Rapporteur Martin
Scheinin
The oversight on intelligence services is organised in
extremely diverse ways in EU Member States. A single
model would be an impossible objective because
national oversight frameworks have to directly link to
the political institutions and administrative and judicial
organisation of each Member State.235 Table 1 is based
on a model developed by Cousseran and Hayez and
adapted by FRA for comparative analysis purposes. It
highlights that effective oversight requires a multiplicity
of actors assessing a variety of aspects. However,
the essential requirement of an effective oversight
framework is that it is comprehensive. Comprehensive
oversight requires the oversight of all aspects of the
services’ work, of which surveillance operations are
but one element.
To fulfil their mandate, intelligence services need
to act in secret and often to use methods that will
involve access to personal data and intrude upon
personal privacy. In democratic states, this also
means the protection of an open society through the
use of secret tools. “It is because of this paradox […],
that the security and intelligence services should be
the object of democratic accountability and civilian
control”.233 Oversight of intelligence services is one of
the conditions of the services’ legitimacy.234
233 Born, H. and Leigh, I. (2005), p. 16. See also France,
DPR & CNCTR (2017), p. 2.
234 Cousseran, J.-C. and Hayez, P. (2015), p. 288.
235 See Cousseran, J.-C. and Hayez, P. (2015), p. 291.
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