MR JUSTICE BURTON
Approved Judgment
Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No.2)[1990] 1
AC 109, per Lord Griffiths at 269F.
6. As a result, the mere fact that the Intelligence Services are
carrying out an investigation or operation in relation to, say, a
terrorist group, or hold information on a suspected terrorist,
will itself be sensitive. If, for example, a hostile individual or
group were to become aware that they were the subject of
interest by the Intelligence Services, they could not only take
steps to thwart any (covert) investigation or operation but also
attempt to discover, and perhaps publicly reveal, the methods
used by the Intelligence Services or the identities of the officers
or agents involved. Conversely, if a hostile individual or group
were to become aware that they were not the subject of
Intelligence Service interest, they would then know that they
could engage or continue to engage in their undesirable
activities with increased vigour and increased confidence that
they will not be detected.
7. In addition, an appropriate degree of secrecy must be
maintained as regards the intelligence-gathering capabilities
and techniques of the Intelligence Services (and any gaps in or
limits to those capabilities and techniques).
If hostile
individuals or groups acquire detailed information on such
matters then they will be able to adapt their conduct to avoid,
or at least minimise, the risk that the Intelligence Services will
be able successfully to deploy those capabilities and techniques
against them.
8. It has thus been the policy of successive UK Governments to
neither confirm nor deny whether they are monitoring the
activities of a particular group or individual, or hold
information on a particular group or individual, or have had
contact with a particular individual. Similarly, the longstanding policy of the UK Government is to neither confirm nor
deny the truth of claims about the operational activities of the
Intelligence Services, including their intelligence-gathering
capabilities and techniques.
9. Further, the “neither confirm nor deny” principle would be
rendered nugatory, and national security thereby seriously
damaged, if every time that sensitive information were
disclosed without authority (i.e. “leaked”), or it was alleged
that there had been such unauthorised disclosure of such
information, the UK Government were then obliged to confirm
or deny the veracity of the information in question.
10. It has thus been the policy of successive Governments to
adopt a neither confirm nor deny stance in relation to any
information derived from any alleged leak regarding the
activities or operations of the Intelligence Services insofar as