MR JUSTICE BURTON
Approved Judgment
ii)
42.
They are subject to proper oversight.
As to their existence, arrangements are provided for in the statutory framework to
which we have referred in paragraph 18 (ii), (v) and (viii) above. Mr Farr in his
witness statement explains as follows:
“51. The Intelligence Services take their legal duties under the
regime very seriously. The statutory framework is underpinned
by detailed internal guidance (including the “arrangements" to
which reference is made in section 2 of the Security Service Act
1989 and sections 2 and 4 of the Intelligence Services Act
1994), and by a culture of compliance.
52. This culture of compliance is reinforced by the provision of
mandatory training to staff within the Intelligence Services
regarding the legal and policy framework within which they
operate. The training includes clear instructions on the need
for strict adherence to the law and to internal guidance.
...
55. The full details of the arrangements between the
Intelligence Services and the UK's foreign intelligence partners
for the sharing of intelligence, and the internal guidance of the
Intelligence Services for the handling and use of intelligence
obtained as a result, are (and have always been) kept
confidential. I am satisfied that they cannot safely be published
without undermining the interests of national security and the
prevention and detection of serious crime. There are four main
reasons for this.”
Mr Eadie on instructions stated in open hearing that such arrangements also
included provision for destruction. Mr Farr also referred in paragraph 74 of his
witness statement to what the ISC had said in paragraph 7 of its Statement, set out in
paragraph 23 above, as to GCHQ having put in place policies and procedures to
underpin the statutory provisions.
43.
In paragraphs 56 to 61 of his witness statement Mr Farr explained why in his belief
“the full details of the arrangement between the Intelligence Services and the UK’s
Foreign Intelligence Partners for the sharing of intelligence, and the internal
guidance of the Intelligence Services for the handling and use of intelligence
obtained as a result are (and have always been) kept confidential . . . and cannot
safely be published without undermining the interest of national security and the
prevention and detection of serious crime”. He gives four detailed reasons, to
which we refer.
44.
These rules or arrangements (in respect of any or all of the Claimants’ three
‘categories’) were thus not made known in their detail to the public, and to that
extent are not accessible, and, unlike the Code published under RIPA, to which we
shall turn, not even a summary of what they contain was disclosed. However the