completed its investigation of 43 of these during the year as well as concluding
its investigation of 57 of the 67 cases carried over from 2001/2002. 76 cases have
been carried forward to 2004. On no occasion has the Tribunal concluded that
there has been a contravention of RIPA or the Human Rights Act 1998.
Assistance to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal
31. Section 57(3) of RIPA requires me to give all such assistance to the
Tribunal as the Tribunal may require in relation to investigations and other
specified matters. I was not asked to assist the Tribunal during the year 2003.
Errors
32. A significant number of errors and breaches have been reported to me
during the course of the year – 39 in all. Although the level of errors is the same
as that in 2002, the number is still unacceptably high. By way of example, details
of some of these errors and breaches are recorded below. It is very important
from the point of view of the public that I stress that none of the breaches or
errors were deliberate, that all were caused by human or procedural error or by
technical problems and that in every case either no interception took place or,
if there was interception, the product was destroyed immediately on discovery
of the error. The most common cause of error tends to be the simple
transposition of numbers by mistake e.g., 1809 instead of 1890. The examples
that I give are typical of the totality and are anonymous. Full details of the
errors and breaches are set out in the Confidential Annex.
33. The Home Office reported, on behalf of the National Technical Assistance
Centre (NTAC), a breach of RIPA by a communications service provider
(CSP), brief details of which are recorded later in this report under the CSPs.
34. The Scottish Executive reported to me an erroneous termination of an
intercept and several other errors by CSPs that arose in their cases, brief details
of which are recorded later in this report under the CSPs.
35. The Northern Ireland Office reported one error that occurred in a
modification instrument to an interception warrant. The modification sought to
add a new mobile telephone number to a warrant. Unfortunately, the mobile
telephone number cited on the modification was that of a serving police officer
and not a number used by the target. The interception was immediately ceased.
The incorrect telephone number was deleted from the warrant and the correct
number added.
36. Seven errors were reported by GCHQ of which three are briefly
highlighted below. The first case concerns the need to remove four telephone
numbers from a warrant. There is a due process in place that ensures that the
deletion of numbers and cessation of interception occurs promptly.
Unfortunately, a step in this process was overlooked and a check sheet, which
should ensure that all steps in the process are followed, was not used.
Consequently, the numbers continued to be intercepted. The product from the
unauthorised intercepted calls has been destroyed. To prevent a recurrence,
staff within GCHQ have been rebriefed on the necessity of using the check
sheet to ensure all steps in the modification process are followed.
37. The second case involves avoidable human error: a transcriber failed to
take the appropriate action when the circumstances of a target changed. This
led to the unauthorised interception of three calls. These have been deleted and
the relevant staff reminded of their responsibilities in ensuring the correct
procedures are followed in similar cases.
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