Report of the Independent Surveillance Review
39
these agencies’.36 These criticisms over its membership, outputs and degree of
independent scrutiny have contributed to the deficit in public confidence, as illustrated
by an Ipsos MORI survey from May 2014, shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: ‘Currently, the UK’s intelligence agencies are held to account on behalf of the
public by a committee of politicians. How much confidence, if any, do you have in the
current system of holding the intelligence agencies in the UK to account?’
Don’t know
12%
Not at all confident
14%
Very confident
5%
35%
Fairly confident
34%
Not very confident
Source: Ipsos MORI
2.38
Oversight through elected representatives is an essential principle in a democracy, and
the Committee is intended to be an important vehicle for transparency. However, as a
result of the criticisms outlined above, the public perception is that politicians – who do
not tend to score highly in surveys gauging public trust of various professions – are not
best placed to provide oversight of the agencies.
2.39
A second layer of oversight, provided for in legislation, comes in the form of the
commissioners – comprising a number of retired senior judges – who, among other
functions, retrospectively assess the necessity and proportionality of samples of
warrants granting authorisation to intercept citizens’ communications. However, they
have also come under criticism, particularly, it is said, because they are ‘only part-time,
inspect a small proportion of intercept warrants, have not publicly found a warrant to be
disproportionate, have refused to provide adequate statistics and are under-resourced’.37
Evidence submitted to the ISR Panel suggests that the commissioners and their work are
not well known among the general public, and the role of the expert inspectors who
support them is equally underappreciated by their critics.
36. Ibid., p. 25.
37. Ibid., p. 27.