Report of the Independent Surveillance Review
2.
3.
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For the acquisition of communications data in bulk, a bulk communications data
warrant which would be limited to the acquisition of communications data
For the acquisition of communications data otherwise than in bulk, an
authorisation by the relevant public authority. Communications data should only
be acquired after the authorisation is granted by a designated person.
Judicial and Ministerial Authorisation of Warrants
Recommendation 10: We recommend that the government adopts a composite
approach to the authorisation of warrants, dependent on the purpose for which the
warrant is sought and subsequent degree of ministerial input required. Our approach
does not discriminate between whether it is law enforcement or an intelligence agency
submitting the warrant.
1.
2.
Where a warrant (see points 1a, 1b and 2 in Recommendation 9) is sought for
a purpose relating to the detection or prevention of serious and organised
crime, the warrant should always be authorised by a judicial commissioner. Most
police and other law-enforcement warrants would fall into this category. A copy
of each warrant should be provided to the home secretary (so that the home
secretary and officials can periodically examine trends in serious and organised
crime, for example)
Where a warrant (see points 1a, 1b and 2 in Recommendation 9) is sought for
purposes relating to national security (including counter-terrorism, support to
military operations, diplomacy and foreign policy) and economic well-being, the
warrant should be authorised by the secretary of state subject to judicial review
by a judicial commissioner. The review should take place before implementation
of the warrant. If there is a case of urgency the secretary of state should be
able to direct that a warrant comes into force immediately, and the judicial
commissioner should be notified straight away and the judicial review conducted
within fourteen days.
The judicial commissioners in charge of the authorisation of warrants should not be
part of a new National Intelligence and Surveillance Office nor should they be based
in a government department, but alternative office facilities should be sought so
that the commissioners are accessible but remain independent. To ensure no loss of
operational efficiency, appropriately qualified judges would have to be available at all
times throughout the year.
Investigatory Powers Tribunal
Recommendation 11: The Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) should be as open as
possible and proactively find ways that make its business less opaque to the public.