94
4.94
A Democratic Licence to Operate
The ISR Panel note two particular concerns that arise from the case. The first is that the
IPT could have made such a significant error, pointing to clear procedural improvements
that will need to be implemented. A second concern is that the case represents a more
systemic weakness of the IPT, in that errors only come to light after claimants make an
application to the Tribunal, rather than through the established oversight mechanisms
of the commissioners or ISC.
Ministerial Oversight
4.95
Ministerial accountability for the intelligence services is provided by the SSA 1989 and
ISA 1994 and specifically by authorisation of warrants by secretaries of state under RIPA
2000. Under specific conditions (as not all surveillance activity requires a secretary of
state-signed warrant), they provide the final level of pre-activity authorisation.
4.96
All warrants will have gone through an assessment by both the submitting agency and
the receiving government department,62 including by legal counsel, before reaching the
secretary of state for approval.63 However, even if a request is necessary, proportionate
and legally sound, it may still be rejected on the basis of a political risk assessment. The
number of refused requests is not currently published.
Parliamentary Oversight: The Intelligence and Security Committee
4.97
The ISC was first established by the ISA 1994 to examine the expenditure, administration
and policy of the three British security and intelligence agencies. The ISC was reformed
under the Justice and Security Act 2013 to make it a Committee of Parliament and to
provide greater powers and the legal obligation for the agencies to provide material to
the Committee. The statutory remit of the ISC was also expanded to include:
•
•
•
4.98
A role in overseeing the wider government intelligence community (beyond the
three security and intelligence agencies)
Retrospective oversight of the operational activities of the agencies on matters
of significant national interest
Powers to require information from the agencies, subject only to a veto by the
secretary of state rather than agency heads as was the case under the ISA 1994.64
In addition to the three intelligence and security agencies, the ISC now examines the
intelligence-related work of the Cabinet Office including the JIC, the Assessments Staff
and the National Security Secretariat. The Committee also provides oversight of Defence
62. Even urgent requests will go before at least two other people before reaching the
secretary of state.
63. For example, in the FCO the Intelligence Policy Unit head sees approximately 95 per cent
of submissions but some particularly sensitive requests will go straight to the director
general, defence and intelligence; ISR visit to the FCO, March 2015.
64. Legislation.gov.uk, ‘Justice and Security Act 2013, Explanatory Notes’.