fences as an important mission of a polity governed by the rule of law (cf. BVerfGE
77, p. 65 [at p. 76] with further references; BVerfGE 80, p. 367 [at p. 375]).
2. The parliament has also complied with the requirement that it determine, precisely and specifically for each area, the objectives for which personal data may be transferred and further used (cf. BVerfGE 65, 1 [at p. 46]). This provision permits a transfer
of data to the receiving agencies specified in § 3.5 of the G 10 Act only to the extent
that this is required for the execution of the receiving agency's duties. Thus, the provision refers to the intelligence service tasks, the administrative and monitoring duties
and the missions of crime prevention, of the resistance to threats and of the prosecution of criminal offences that are assigned to the respective receiving agencies.
§ 3.3(1) of the G 10 Act further delimits the objectives of use, in the framework of
these agencies' tasks, to the prevention, resolution or prosecution of the listed criminal offences.
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3. Moreover, the objectives justifying the transfer of data are consistent with the objective for which a restriction of telecommunications privacy has already taken place,
and which resulted in the collection of data (cf. BVerfGE 65, p. 1 [at p. 62]).
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It is true that the Federal Intelligence Service's telecommunications monitoring without an existing suspicion is only permissible for strategic surveillance. The characteristic feature of this type of monitoring is that its aim is not to initiate measures against
specific individuals but that it concerns threatening situations on an international level
about which the Federal government is supposed to be informed. Only this limited objective justifies such a broad scope and the depth of encroachment upon fundamental
rights that results from monitoring without an existing suspicions. If the monitoring
were, from the outset, justified by efforts aimed at the prevention or prosecution of
criminal offences, the power to conduct such monitoring would not be consistent with
Article 10 of the Basic Law (cf. BVerfGE 67, p. 157 [at pp. 180-181]. Limitations on
employing specified methods of collecting data, which are required by fundamental
rights, may not be evaded by making legally gathered data available for objectives
that would otherwise not justify monitoring.
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Article 10 of the Basic Law does not, however, exclude all transfers of data to agencies that may not or should not be permitted, on their own, to conduct telecommunications monitoring without an existing suspicion. As the Federal Intelligence Service, on
account of the liberal methods it is permitted to employ, necessarily screens a large
number of acts of telecommunication that are from the outset irrelevant for the receiving agencies, it must, in any case, be ensured that these agencies are not permitted
to access the complete stock of data. On the other hand, it does not contradict the primary objective for which the data is collected if information that is relevant to the prevention, resolution or prosecution of criminal offences (although it has been collected
with different objectives in mind) is transferred to the agencies mentioned under § 3.5
of the G 10 Act after careful examination of the data by the Federal Intelligence Service. The provisions of the challenged regulation that govern the transfer of data com-
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65/77