by other authorities, that are connected with monitoring), may lead to inhibitions in
communication, to communication disturbances and to the individual adapting his or
her behaviour, in this context especially in order to avoid specific contents of conversation or specific terms. In this context, not only the individual impairment of a large
number of holders of fundamental rights must be taken into consideration. Rather, the
secret monitoring of telecommunications traffic concerns the communication of society as a whole. Therefore, the Federal Constitutional Court has stated that the right
to informational self-determination, which is comparable in this respect, also bears a
relation to the common good that goes beyond the interest of the individual (cf. BVerfGE 65, p. 1 [at p. 43]).
cc) On the other hand, it is of importance that the restrictions of fundamental rights
serve to protect high-ranking public interests.
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Monitoring measures based on § 3.1(1) and § 3.1 sent. 2 no. 1 of the G 10 Act are
supposed to yield intelligence about facts that are relevant under defence policy aspects so that threats to the Federal Republic of Germany involving armed aggression
can be timely recognised. It is true that the nature of such a threat has changed with
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The Act, however, is not bound to the historical
constellation that the parliament had in mind when enacting the law. Rather, the
telecommunications monitoring regime can still be applied even if the threat that such
measures are intended to counteract has shifted. This is true in the case of the threat
of armed aggression. Even after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, this threat still
exists.
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In the new areas of monitoring, increased threats have developed due to the increase of internationally organised crime, in particular in the area of illegal trade with
weapons of war and with drugs as well as in the area of money laundering. Even if
such activities cannot, altogether, be put in the same category of importance as
armed aggression aimed at the Federal Republic of Germany, they considerably affect, in any case, the foreign and security policy interests of the Federal Republic of
Germany. Nor are the threats in the specified areas remote. In the area of weapons
proliferation, the Federal government has furnished sufficient examples that are generally known.
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The threats, the sources of which are predominantly located abroad and which are
supposed to be detected by means of the authority to restrict telecommunications privacy, are of great importance. This still applies to the threat of armed aggression but
also, as has been sufficiently established by the Federal Intelligence Service, to the
threats of weapons proliferation, arms trade, and international terrorism. The aim behind the mission of foreign surveillance, i.e. to provide the Federal government with
information that is of foreign and security policy interest for the Federal Republic of
Germany, is of considerable importance if the Federal Republic of Germany is to act
effectively in the field of foreign policy and maintain the reputation of its foreign policy.
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