vidual routes of communication, so-called corridors, e.g. specific collective cables for
the transfer of long-distance calls to the respective area.
Meanwhile, the incorporation of nos. 2 to 6 into the G 10 Act has considerably increased the quantity of threats about which intelligence should be gathered. Consequently, surveillance is no longer restricted to a single crisis region. This means that
the geographical area that may be covered by monitoring measures has been considerably expanded. The observation of satellite radiuses has considerably increased
the volume of screened telecommunication traffic links. Under these circumstances,
mainly the search concepts as defined by § 3.2 of the G 10 Act that are approved in
the order establishing the monitoring measures, which control the selection of the
monitored telecommunications contacts, serve to limit surveillance.
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Finally, the anonymity of the act of communication is no longer assured as was the
case under the previous regime. It is true that the search concepts as defined by § 3.2
of the G 10 Act, apart from the exception in sent. 3 that is not under review here, may
not contain any characteristics for identification that result in the targeted screening of
specific acts of telecommunication traffic. This prohibition, however, no longer shields
the subscriber lines to which it applies from the identification of the subscribers in the
same way as it used to do. One reason for this is that, due to the development of
technology, the information regarding the circumstances of an act of communication,
including the parties' identities, is also gathered and retained. On the other hand, the
identification of individuals now results from the fact that the threats that have been
newly incorporated into the Act are, to a far greater extent, related to specific individuals than was the case with respect to the threat of war. Furthermore, the Federal Intelligence Service concedes that monitoring often only yields the desired intelligence if
the identity of the individual communication partners is disclosed.
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In present practice, the Federal Intelligence Service, according to its own statements in the oral argument, mainly monitors the telex and fax traffic that is routed via
telecommunications satellites. The Federal Intelligence Service claims that telephone
traffic is only monitored to a very limited extent, communication via radio is, as of yet,
not being monitored at all. According to the considerations presented in the oral argument, the Federal Intelligence Service plans to expand monitoring to e-mail traffic.
Pursuant to the information provided by the Federal Intelligence Service, the essence
of which was not challenged in a substantial way at the oral argument, approximately
15,000 acts of telecommunications traffic are processed by the conversion devices
every day. Pursuant to the legal opinion that Article 10 of the Basic Law and the G 10
Act are not relevant in this context, 14,000 of them are classified as falling under the
tasks regulated in § 1 of the Gesetz über den Bundesnachrichtendienst (BNDG, Federal Intelligence Service Act). Apart from that, approximately 700 acts of telecommunications traffic fall under the G 10 Act, 70 contain search concepts and are
processed by Federal Intelligence Service staff, 20 appear to be relevant and are
evaluated. The present extent of screening is, however, not prescribed by the Act but
above all determined by the existing technical and personal capacities and can there-
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