In spite of this, the surveillance of foreign threats is the most important aspect of the
challenged regulation. Its primary objective is to gain intelligence for the mission of
the Federal intelligence service. This becomes evident from the wording of the Act.
§ 1.1 no. 2 of the G 10 Act explicitly inserts telecommunication surveillance conducted for the objectives of § 3.1 sent. 2 nos. 2-6 of the G 10 Act in the framework of the
mission of the Federal Intelligence Service pursuant to § 1.2 of the Federal Intelligence Service Act (BNDG). The mission consists in collecting and evaluating the information required for the gathering of intelligence about foreign countries that is of
importance for the foreign and security policy of the Federal Republic of Germany.
This conferral to the Federal Intelligence Service of the authority to conduct such
monitoring is followed by an autonomous context of regulation and use that is based
upon § 3.4 of the G 10 Act and §§ 2, 4, 12 of the BNDG, but is independent of the
fight against crime. This context of regulation and use is determined by the mission of
the Federal Intelligence Service. According to this regulation, the intelligence gathered is to be converted into situation reports, analyses and reports on individual
events that are addressed to the Federal government. It is intended that they will enable the Federal government to timely recognise situations of threat and to counteract
them politically.
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The individual threats identified in § 3.1 sent. 2 nos. 2-6 of the G 10 Act also show
the required relation to the foreign and security policy interests that the Federal Republic of Germany must safeguard as a member of the community of states and in its
relation to intergovernmental institutions. Acts of weapons proliferation, arms trade,
international terrorism, drug export and money laundering occurring in this context, all
of which are relevant under criminal law, cannot only be regarded as international
crime. Rather, such activities are characterised by the fact that they often emanate
from foreign states or foreign organisations whose operations are supported or tolerated by the state, and that such operations take on dimensions that require international counter-measures. The Federal Republic of Germany must, therefore, be in a
position to shape its foreign and security policy and its international co-operation to
combat these activities and, to be able to do so, requires the corresponding intelligence. This is also true with respect to its ability to act (inter alia, as a member of NATO).
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Nor can it be said from the outset that the threat of counterfeiting committed abroad
(no. 5) bears no relation to the foreign affairs to which Article 73 no. 1 of the Basic
Law refers. Certainly, the relation to foreign countries is not an inherent feature of
counterfeiting. Such relation, however, is established if counterfeiting occurs with the
participation of foreign countries or if, due to foreign activities, it reaches a scale that
threatens monetary stability in Germany. In these cases, counterfeiting cannot sufficiently be combated by criminal prosecution on the domestic territory but requires foreign policy reactions.
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Finally, if the subject of the regulation falls under the category of foreign affairs, (this
is determined by the primary objective of the regulation), the duty of the Federal Intel-
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