ger emerges from this for the personality of the person concerned. A basis for empowerment is required for this.
bb) An encroachment on the right to informational self-determination does not apply
if a state agency enters a communication relationship with a subject of fundamental
rights under a cover, but does apply if in doing so it exploits a trust that is worthy of
protection of the person concerned in the identity and the motivation of a communication partner in order to gather personal data which it would otherwise not receive (see
re investigations by undercover investigators Federal Administrative Court – BVerwG, Judgment of 29 April 1997 – 1 C 2/95 –, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1997, p.
2534; Di Fabio, in: Maunz/Dürig, GG, Art. 2.1, marginal no. 176; Duttge, Juristenzeitung 1996, p. 556 (562-563); Murswiek, in: Sachs, GG, 4th ed., 2007, Article 2
marginal no. 88 b; Warntjen, Geheime Zwangsmaßnahmen und der Kernbereich privater Lebensgestaltung, 2007, p. 163; specifically re investigations on the Web Germann, Gefahrenabwehr und Strafverfolgung im Internet, 2000, pp. 519 et seq.).
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Accordingly, pure Internet reconnaissance will not as a rule bring about an encroachment on fundamental rights. The communication services of the Internet facilitate to a large degree the expansion of communication relationships in the context of
which the trust of a communication partner in the identity and truthfulness of his or her
communication partners is not worthy of protection since no examination mechanisms are available for it. This also applies if certain persons – for instance in the context of a discussion forum – participate in the communication over a longer period and
by these means a kind of “electronic community” has formed. Also in the context of
such a communication relationship, each participant is aware that he or she does not
know the identity of his or her partner, or at least is unable to examine his or her information about himself or herself. His or her trust that he or she is not communicating
with a state agency is, as a consequence, not worthy of protection.
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III.
Since § 5.2 no. 11 of the North Rhine-Westphalia Constitution Protection Act is null
and void as a whole, the complaints submitted against § 5.3 and § 17 of the North
Rhine-Westphalia Constitution Protection Act are disposed of. Insofar as the complainants’ complaints are admissible, the unconstitutionality of the impugned provisions is claimed only with regard to measures according to the provision that is null
and void.
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IV.
§ 5a.1 of the North Rhine-Westphalia Constitution Protection Act is compatible with
the Basic Law insofar as its area of application was expanded to cover activities within the meaning of § 3.1 no. 1 of the North Rhine-Westphalia Constitution Protection
Act. In particular, this provision does not violate Article 2.1 in conjunction with Article
1.1 of the Basic Law.
55/60
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