which RIPA makes adequate provision by permitting modification by senior
officials). This has led to a commensurate increase in the volume of the Scottish
Executive’s paperwork, and while the modification procedure has removed
much of the bureaucratic burden from Ministers, they are adapting their
working arrangements to cope with the demands arising from this aspect of
RIPA. They are, however, closely monitoring the increases in interception to
ensure that each individual application (whether a new application or
modification) meets the strict criteria specified in the Act. This remains the
most important aspect of their interception procedures.
25. The Scottish Executive’s overall view is that the mechanisms for the
interception of communications are more efficient, but there is no doubt that
the volume of paperwork generated by the new procedures places considerable
demands on their Warrants Unit.
Northern Ireland Office
26. During the year the Northern Ireland Office handled a significant volume
of transactions under the new legislation. In general they found the processing
of warrant modifications to be speedier under RIPA. This is particularly
helpful in counter terrorism and serious crime (drugs) casework in which
targets, for operational and security reasons, make frequent changes of their
mobile telephones. Speed of response is essential in enabling the police to
maintain intercept coverage of their targets. The ability to seek emergency
authorisations through specified officials has also eased the process. In the
context of serious crime the Northern Ireland Office have found it beneficial to
have warrants operated for three months compared to one month previously,
thereby reducing the bureaucratic workload on staff dealing with revalidations
on a monthly basis.
Ministry of Defence
27. The MOD and HM Armed Forces undertake a wide range of interception
of communications in support of GCHQ and during the conduct of their own
military operations overseas. The former are authorised by warrants obtained
by GCHQ.
Government Communications Headquarters
28. GCHQ considers that a major advantage of RIPA is that it focuses the
mind of the Secretary of State on the target and requires that he must consider
the proportionality of the proposed course of action: subordinate details, such
as the telephone number used by the target is in the schedule part of the
warrant and remains subject to careful scrutiny as under the previous
arrangements. RIPA (and the implementation of the Human Rights Act)
provided the impetus for a thorough examination of GCHQ’s handling
processes. Whilst this led to some minor rationalisation, it is the case that there
has been no real reduction in paperwork or bureaucracy - either for GCHQ
officials or those in the FCO who normally deal with warrant applications and
modifications and who scrutinise the scheduled parts of the warrants. The
greater and more extensive formality of the procedures involved has brought
some additional costs in terms of effort devoted to them by staff in Operations.
However, GCHQ is unable to quantify this and there has been no adverse
impact on the production of required intelligence.
29. It may be of interest to know that prior to the coming into force of RIPA
and the Human Rights Act 1998 in October 2000, GCHQ undertook extensive
preparatory work to ensure that the requirements laid upon the agency were
fully understood and met. These included the establishment of RIPA/human
rights strategy and working groups to develop the new processes and staff
training needed and to ensure that these were implemented successfully.
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