simple transposition of numbers by mistake e.g. 3142 instead of 3124. The
examples that I give are typical of the totality and are anonymous. Full details
of the errors and breaches are set out in the Confidential Annex.
68. One administrative error occurred at the Home Office. The issue of a new
schedule to authorise the interception of a landline was sought but the Home
Office obtained the signature to a modification of an existing schedule.
Fortunately the intercept was still in the process of being set up; it was
immediately suspended. The Home Office subsequently obtained
authorisation for the issue of a new schedule.
69. The Security Service reported a total of nine errors. In one case, an error
occurred when an existing warrant, that was modified under the emergency
procedures, was not renewed or suspended within the required timescale i.e.,
five days. The relevant investigative section in the Service decided not to renew
the intercept and asked that it be suspended by the section responsible for
providing the transcription. Unfortunately, a communication breakdown
occurred between the sections resulting in the Service receiving product until
the error was finally noticed 4 days later. The intercept was immediately
suspended and the product destroyed, none of which had been transcribed. The
mistake was originally the result of a lack of communication between these two
sections within the Security Service with the breach not being reported and
addressed in a timely and effective way. I understand that the staff in the
sections concerned have been reminded of the importance or reporting
breaches promptly and clearly so that a repetition can be avoided.
70. The second error occurred in a warrant that covered the interception of
two landlines and a mobile telephone. The three lines covered by the warrant
were suspended. The mobile telephone line was then deleted from the warrant
as it had not been producing intelligence of interest prior to suspension. The
two landlines were not deleted at this time for operational reasons. The two
landlines were subsequently re-imposed but when this was done the check on
the mobile telephone was also re-imposed in error at the communications
service provider at the Security Service’s behest. This reveals that both the CSP
and the Security Service were at fault. Although the Security Service
incorrectly advised the CSP to re-impose the mobile telephone line, the CSP
should not have done so as there was no schedule in place to cover the
interception. During the period until the error was discovered three calls were
intercepted. Although these calls were listened to, nothing was transcribed and
all the calls have been erased from the Security Service’s recording system.
71. The third error occurred in the case of a postal intercept address being
added to a warrant. Before the Security Service requested the addition of the
address to the warrant they confirmed with the CSP that the address was
accurate. Consequently, the address was added to the warrant. Subsequent
enquiries with the CSP established the correct postcode for the address, a code
that was different to that on the warrant. Once the error was discovered the
postal intercept was suspended and a modification sought to delete the address
from the warrant. The addition of the correct address was not sought, however,
and as the other address details were correct no mail to anywhere other than
the target address was intercepted.
72. Four of the remaining six errors involved separate warrants containing
incorrect telephone numbers; individual digits within the numbers being
transposed incorrectly. On discovery, the unlawful intercepts were
immediately suspended. In two cases product was received but it was not
transcribed. The product was immediately destroyed. In the third case no calls
were intercepted. The fourth was different in that it represented a technical
breach of RIPA for although there was a mistaken transposition of digits on the
modification form, the intended number was intercepted as it had been passed
correctly to the communications service provider.
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