Interception of Communications Act, making it more effective and efficient in
response to the changing nature of today’s communications environment.
RIPA also offered an opportunity to legislate for the interception of
communications other than those offered by public telecommunications
operators and the Post Office, which are being used increasingly by SIS targets
(particularly internet communications). When the legislation is fully enacted,
SIS will be able to extend and improve its interception capabilities against
priority targets.
41.
The main advantages are:
●
Quicker arrangements for modifying the telephone numbers being
targeted. Rather than seeking the signature of the Secretary of State for
amendments or new warrants for each communications service provider
(CSP) used by the target (as under the Interception of Communications
Act), schedules can now be modified by a designated senior official. This
improves their coverage of targets who are increasingly switching their
communications systems between CSPs.
●
Extended renewal period for warrants on the prevention or detection of
serious crime grounds (now three months instead of one). This allows for
better assessment of the product and of the justification for renewal of
the warrant. It also reduces the administrative burden.
●
More efficient urgency procedures (although SIS has not yet needed to
deploy them). In urgent circumstances, schedules may now be modified
in-house, rather than obtaining oral authority from the Secretary of
State, which was required to modify an Interception of Communications
Act warrant.
42. RIPA has not required SIS to make significant changes to its handling
procedures for safeguarding intercepted material. Only a small amount of
updating has been required to ensure full compliance with RIPA.
Metropolitan Police Special Branch
43. The new legislation was eagerly anticipated at the MPSB, who have
traditionally had to deal with sophisticated targets using a variety of
communications methods that the previous legislation, the Interception of
Communications Act, could not adequately cope with.
44. In the view of MPSB there is a disadvantage inherent in the enhanced
flexibility for coping with new technology in that RIPA requires more
paperwork and, most importantly, an individual agency itself now has to
process this greatly expanded paperwork. MPSB has found this quite difficult
where the staffing of the warrants unit underscores the recognition that
interception is a relatively minor, albeit important, activity compared with
other forms of surveillance or with their other core functions such as ports and
protection work.
45. MPSB are unable to say whether their warrantry caseload has increased
under RIPA, as this was already on a rapidly rising wave before RIPA came
into force in October 2000. The trend has continued since then. MPSB
recognises that RIPA has enabled them to respond more swiftly to changes in
their targets’ communications although they do not believe that it has led to an
increase in actual targeting.
46. Despite a slightly hesitant start, when it appeared to MPSB to be more
straightforward to obtain a new warrant than an amended schedule, things have
now settled down to a more balanced arrangement.
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