Intercepting non-external communications under
section 8(4) warrants
6.6. Section 5(6)(a) of RIPA makes clear that the conduct authorised
by a section 8(4) warrant may, in principle, include the interception of
communications which are not external communications to the extent
this is necessary in order to intercept the external communications to
which the warrant relates.
6.7. When conducting interception under a section 8(4) warrant, an
intercepting agency must use its knowledge of the way in which
international communications are routed, combined with regular
surveys of relevant communications links, to identify those individual
communications bearers that are most likely to contain external
communications that will meet the descriptions of material certified
by the Secretary of State under section 8(4). It must also conduct the
interception in ways that limit the collection of non-external
communications to the minimum level compatible with the objective
of intercepting wanted external communications.
Application for a section 8(4) warrant
6.8. An application for a warrant is made to the Secretary of State.
Interception warrants, when issued, are addressed to the person who
submitted the application. The purpose of such a warrant will
typically reflect one or more of the intelligence priorities set by the
National Security Council (NSC).17
6.9. Prior to submission, each application is subject to a review
within the agency making the application. This involves scrutiny by
more than one official, who will consider whether the application is
for a purpose falling within section 5(3) of RIPA and whether the
interception proposed is both necessary and proportionate.
6.10. Each application, a copy of which must be retained by the
applicant, should contain the following information:
17 One of the NSC’s functions is to set the priorities for intelligence coverage for GCHQ and SIS.
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