BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
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statutory framework governing access to private communications remained
accurate.
2. Privacy and security: a modern and transparent legal framework
151. Following its statement in July 2013, the ISC conducted a more indepth inquiry into the full range of the intelligence services’ capabilities. Its
report, which contained an unprecedented amount of information about the
intelligence services’ intrusive capabilities, was published on 12 March
2015 (see paragraphs 11-13 above).
152. The ISC was satisfied that the United Kingdom’s intelligence and
security services did not seek to circumvent the law, including the
requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998, which governs everything that
they do. However, it considered that as the legal framework had developed
piecemeal, it was unnecessarily complicated. The ISC therefore had serious
concerns about the resulting lack of transparency, which was not in the
public interest. Consequently, its key recommendation was that the current
legal framework be replaced by a new Act of Parliament which should
clearly set out the intrusive powers available to the intelligence services, the
purposes for which they may use them, and the authorisation required
before they may do so.
153. With regard to GCHQ’s bulk interception capability, the inquiry
showed that the intelligence services did not have the legal authority, the
resources, the technical capability, or the desire to intercept every
communication of British citizens, or of the Internet as a whole: thus,
GCHQ were not reading the emails of everyone in the United Kingdom. On
the contrary, GCHQ’s bulk interception systems operated on a very small
percentage of the bearers that made up the Internet and the ISC was satisfied
that GCHQ applied levels of filtering and selection such that only a certain
amount of the material on those bearers was collected. Further targeted
searches ensured that only those items believed to be of the highest
intelligence value were ever presented for analysts to examine, and
therefore only a tiny fraction of those collected were ever seen by human
eyes.
154. In respect of Internet communications, the ISC considered that the
current system of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ communications was confusing
and lacked transparency and it therefore suggested that the Government
publish an explanation of which Internet communications fall under which
category, including a clear and comprehensive list of communications.
155. Nevertheless, the inquiry had established that bulk interception
could not be used to target the communications of an individual in the
United Kingdom without a specific authorisation naming that individual,
signed by a Secretary of State.
156. With regard to section 8(4) warrants, the ISC observed that the
warrant itself was very brief. It further noted that insofar as the