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BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
insofar as possible – States from using this power to circumvent either
domestic law or their Convention obligations.
(iv) Application of the test to material falling into the second category
(α) Accessibility
425. The statutory framework which permits the United Kingdom
intelligence services to request intercepted material from foreign
intelligence agencies is not contained in RIPA. The British-US
Communication Intelligence Agreement of 5 March 1946 specifically
permits the exchange of material between the United States and the United
Kingdom. More generally, the SSA (see paragraphs 98-99 above) and the
ISA (see paragraphs 100-103 above) set out the function of the intelligence
services and require that there be arrangements for ensuring that no
information is obtained by them except so far as necessary for the proper
discharge of their functions; and that no information is disclosed by them
except so far as necessary for that purpose or for the purpose of any criminal
proceedings.
426. Details of the internal arrangements referred to in the SSA and ISA
were disclosed during the Liberty proceedings (the 9 October disclosure –
see paragraphs 26-30 above) and those details have now been incorporated
into the most recent IC Code (see paragraph 109 above).
427. Consequently, the Court considers that there is now a basis in law
for the requesting of intelligence from foreign intelligence agencies, and
that that law is sufficiently accessible. Furthermore, the regime clearly
pursues several legitimate aims, including the interests of national security,
public safety and the economic well-being of the country, the prevention of
disorder or crime, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. It
therefore falls to the Court to assess the foreseeability and necessity of the
regime. As already indicated, it will do so by examining whether the law
meets the following requirements by indicating: the circumstances in which
intercept material can be requested; the procedure to be followed for
examining, using and storing the material obtained; the precautions to be
taken when communicating the material obtained to other parties; and the
circumstances in which the material obtained must be erased or destroyed
(see the third to sixth safeguards referred to in paragraph 307 above).
(β) The circumstances in which intercept material can be requested
428. Chapter 12 of the IC Code (see paragraph 109 above) states that,
save in exceptional circumstances, the intelligence services may only make
a request to a foreign government for unanalysed intercepted
communications and/or associated communications data if an interception
warrant under RIPA has already been issued by the Secretary of State, the
assistance of the foreign government is necessary to obtain the particular