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BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
356. In addition, the Court is not persuaded that the acquisition of
related communications data is necessarily less intrusive than the
acquisition of content. For example, the content of an electronic
communication might be encrypted and, even if it were decrypted, might
not reveal anything of note about the sender or recipient. The related
communications data, on the other hand, could reveal the identities and
geographic location of the sender and recipient and the equipment through
which the communication was transmitted. In bulk, the degree of intrusion
is magnified, since the patterns that will emerge could be capable of
painting an intimate picture of a person through the mapping of social
networks, location tracking, Internet browsing tracking, mapping of
communication patterns, and insight into who a person interacted with (see
paragraph 301 above).
357. Consequently, while the Court does not doubt that related
communications data is an essential tool for the intelligence services in the
fight against terrorism and serious crime, it does not consider that the
authorities have struck a fair balance between the competing public and
private interests by exempting it in its entirety from the safeguards
applicable to the searching and examining of content. While the Court does
not suggest that related communications data should only be accessible for
the purposes of determining whether or not an individual is in the British
Islands, since to do so would be to require the application of stricter
standards to related communications data than apply to content, there should
nevertheless be sufficient safeguards in place to ensure that the exemption
of related communications data from the requirements of section 16 of
RIPA is limited to the extent necessary to determine whether an individual
is, for the time being, in the British Islands.
- Duration of the secret surveillance measure
358. Pursuant to section 9 of RIPA (see paragraph 62 above), a
section 8(4) warrant ceases to have effect at the end of the “relevant period”
unless it is renewed. For warrants issued by the Secretary of State for
reasons of national or economic security, the “relevant period” is six
months, and for warrants issued by the Secretary of State for the purposes of
preventing serious crime, the “relevant period” is three months. These
warrants are renewable for periods of six and three months respectively.
Warrants may be renewed at any point before their expiry date by
application to the Secretary of State. The application must contain the same
information as the original application; it must also contain an assessment of
the value of the interception to date and explain why the continuation of
interception is necessary, within the meaning of section 5(3), and
proportionate (see paragraph 6.22-6.24 of the IC Code at paragraph 90
above). Paragraph 6.7 of the IC Code requires regular surveys of relevant
communications links (see paragraph 90 above). Consequently, any