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BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
of the IC Code – see paragraphs 57 and 90 above). It is clear that insofar as
RIPA and the IC Code use the terms “necessity” and “proportionality” they
are intended to ensure compliance with the requirements of Articles 8 and
10 of the Convention and should therefore be understood in the Convention
sense (see paragraph 3.5 of the IC Code, at paragraph 90 above).
332. The Court has held that the condition of foreseeability does not
require States to set out exhaustively by name the specific offences which
may give rise to interception, provided that there is sufficient detail about
the nature of the offences in question (see Roman Zakharov, cited above,
§§ 243-244; see also, among many examples, Szabó and Vissy, cited above,
§ 64, and Kennedy, cited above, § 159). Moreover, the Court has expressly
recognised the need to avoid excessive rigidity in the wording of certain
statutes and to keep pace with changing circumstances (see Szabó and Vissy,
cited above, § 64 and Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993, § 40, Series A
no. 260-A).
333. In Kennedy the Court had to consider whether the section 5(3)
grounds (which apply to both section 8(1) and section 8(4) warrants)
provided sufficient detail about the nature of the offences that might give
rise to an interception order. It found that the term “national security” was
frequently employed in both national and international legislation and
constituted one of the legitimate aims to which Article 8 § 2 referred. It
further noted that threats to national security tended to vary in character and
might be unanticipated or difficult to define in advance. Finally, the
Interception of Communications Commissioner had clarified that in practice
“national security” allowed surveillance of activities which threatened the
safety or well-being of the State and activities which were intended to
undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or
violent means. It therefore found the term to be sufficiently clear (see
Kennedy, cited above, § 159).
334. Furthermore, the Court observes that “serious crime” is clearly
defined in section 81 of RIPA (see paragraphs 58-59 above; see also
Kennedy, cited above, § 159) and the IC Code has clarified that the purpose
of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom is
restricted to those interests which are also relevant to the interests of
national security (see paragraph 90 above).
335. The Court therefore considers that section 5(3) is sufficiently clear,
giving citizens an adequate indication of the circumstances in which and the
conditions on which a section 8(4) warrant might be issued.
336. As for the persons liable to have their communications intercepted,
it is clear that this category is wide. Section 8(4) only permits the Secretary
of State to issue a warrant for the interception of external communications,
which in principle excludes communications where both of the parties are in
the British Islands. Although there has been some confusion about the
application of the terms “external communications” and “internal