BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
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equivalent guarantees safeguarding his or her rights. In a field where abuse
is potentially so easy in individual cases and could have such harmful
consequences for democratic society as a whole, it is in principle desirable
to entrust supervisory control to a judge, judicial control offering the best
guarantees of independence, impartiality and a proper procedure (see
Roman Zakharov, cited above, § 233; see also Klass and Others, cited
above, §§ 55 and 56).
310. As regards the third stage, after the surveillance has been
terminated, the question of subsequent notification of surveillance measures
is inextricably linked to the effectiveness of remedies before the courts and
hence to the existence of effective safeguards against the abuse of
monitoring powers. There is in principle little scope for recourse to the
courts by the individual concerned unless the latter is advised of the
measures taken without his or her knowledge and thus able to challenge
their legality retrospectively (see Roman Zakharov, cited above, § 234; see
also Klass and Others, cited above, § 57, and Weber and Saravia, cited
above, § 135) or, in the alternative, unless any person who suspects that he
or she has been subject to surveillance can apply to courts, whose
jurisdiction does not depend on notification to the surveillance subject of the
measures taken (see Roman Zakharov, cited above, § 234; see also Kennedy,
cited above, § 167).
(ii) Existing case-law on the bulk interception of communications
311. The Court has considered the Convention compatibility of regimes
which expressly permit the bulk interception of communications on two
occasions: first in Weber and Saravia (cited above), and then in Liberty
and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 58243/00, 1 July 2008.
312. In Weber and Saravia the applicants complained about the process
of strategic monitoring under the amended G10 Act, which authorised the
monitoring of international wireless telecommunications. Signals emitted
from foreign countries were monitored by interception sites situated on
German soil with the aid of certain catchwords which were listed in the
monitoring order. Only communications containing these catchwords were
recorded and used. Having particular regard to the six “minimum
requirements” set out in paragraph 307 above, the Court considered that
there existed adequate and effective guarantees against abuses of the State’s
strategic monitoring powers. It therefore declared the applicants’ Article 8
complaints to be manifestly ill-founded.
313. In Liberty and Others the Court was considering the regime under
section 3(2) of the Interception of Communications Act 1985, which was in
effect the predecessor of the regime under section 8(4) of RIPA.
Section 3(2) allowed the executive to intercept communications passing
between the United Kingdom and an external receiver. At the time of
issuing a section 3(2) warrant, the Secretary of State was required to issue a