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BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
provided that no intercepted material could be read, looked at or listened to
by any person unless it fell within the Secretary of State’s certificate, and it
was proportionate in the circumstances to do so. Furthermore, section 16(2)
placed sufficiently precise limits on the extent to which intercepted material
could be selected to be read, looked at or listened to according to a factor
which was referable to an individual known to be for the time being in the
British Islands and which had as (one of) its purpose(s) the identification of
material contained in communications sent by or intended for him.
288. The Government further argued that paragraphs 6.22-6.24 of the IC
Code made sufficient provision for the duration and renewal of a
section 8(4) warrant, thereby complying with the third requirement
identified in Weber. Pursuant to section 9(2) of RIPA, a section 8(4) warrant
could only be renewed if the Secretary of State believed that it continued to
be necessary, and if the Secretary of State believed that the warrant was no
longer necessary, section 9(3) of RIPA required that it be cancelled.
289. According to the Government, insofar as intercepted material could
not be read, looked at or listened to by a person pursuant to section 16 of
RIPA, it could not be used at all. Prior to its destruction, paragraph 7.7 of
the IC Code required that it be stored securely. For material that could be
read, looked at and listened to pursuant to section 16, the Government
submitted that the regime satisfied the fourth of the Weber requirements. In
particular, material had to be selected for examination through the
application of search terms by equipment operating automatically for that
purpose. If an analyst then wished to select material for examination,
paragraphs 7.14-7.16 of the IC Code required that he or she create a record
setting out why access was required and proportionate, consistent with the
applicable certificate, and stating any circumstances likely to give rise to a
degree of collateral infringement of privacy, and any measures taken to
reduce the extent of that infringement. That record had to be retained for the
purpose of subsequent audit. Paragraphs 7.11-7.20 further required that
material should only be read, looked at or listened to by authorised persons
receiving regular training in the operation of section 16 of RIPA and the
requirements of necessity and proportionality. Finally, material could only
be used by the intelligence services in accordance with their statutory
functions, and only insofar as was proportionate under section 6(1) of the
Human Rights Act 1998.
290. The Government further submitted that the section 8(4) regime
satisfied the fifth Weber requirement. Section 15(2) set out the precautions
to be taken when communicating intercepted material to other people. These
precautions served to ensure that only so much intercepted material as was
“necessary” for the authorised purpose could be disclosed. Paragraphs 7.4
and 7.5 of the IC Code further provided that where intercepted material was
to be disclosed to a foreign State, the intelligence services had to take
reasonable steps to ensure that the authorities of that State had and would