BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
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275. Secondly, they argued that in practice any person was liable to have
his or her communications intercepted under section 8(4). Although the
regime was targeted at “external” communications, there was no clear
definition of “internal” and “external” communications, and in any event
modern technological developments had rendered the distinction between
the two meaningless. While the Secretary of State was required to provide
descriptions of the material he considered it necessary to examine, the ISC
had reported that section 8(4) warrants were framed in generic terms.
276. Thirdly, with regard to the limits on the duration of surveillance,
the applicants submitted that, in practice, a section 8(4) warrant could
continue indefinitely, being renewed every six months by the Secretary of
State pursuant to section 9(1)(b) of RIPA.
277. Fourthly, according to the applicants the procedure for filtering,
storing and analysing intercepted material lacked adequate safeguards and
gave rise to an unacceptable risk of an arbitrary and disproportionate
interference with Article 8 of the Convention. First of all, there was no
requirement that the selectors used to filter intercepted communications be
identified in the Secretary of State’s certificate accompanying the
section 8(4) warrant, and these selectors were not otherwise subject to
oversight. Secondly, the section 16 safeguards only applied where a person
was “known to be for the time being in the British Islands”. Thirdly, the
protections in section 16 of RIPA only applied to the “content” of
intercepted communications, and not the filtering, storage and analysis of
“related communications data”, despite the fact that communications data
was capable of providing the Government with a detailed profile of the most
intimate aspects of a person’s private life.
278. Fifthly, in relation to the communication of intercepted material,
the applicants contended that the requirement that the Secretary of State
ensure that its disclosure was limited to “the minimum that is necessary for
the authorised purposes” was an ineffective safeguard. The authorised
purposes enumerated in section 15(4) of RIPA were extremely wide, and
included situations where the information was or was “likely to become”
necessary for any of the purposes specified in section 5(3) of RIPA.
279. Sixth and finally, the applicants submitted that there were no
effective or binding safeguards against the disproportionate retention of
intercepted data. Indeed, according to the applicants it was clear from the
third IPT judgment in the Liberty proceedings that Amnesty International’s
communications had been stored without the appropriate (automated)
deletion procedures being followed, and neither the intelligence services nor
the oversight and audit mechanisms had detected this.
280. In addition to arguing that the Weber requirements were not
satisfied, the applicants in any event contended that they were no longer
sufficient to ensure that a communications surveillance regime was
compatible with Article 8 of the Convention. Weber had been decided in