should be allowed to also use also for operational purposes, the transfer is subject to
§ 20v sec. 5 sentence 1 nos. 2 et seq. BKAG.
b) § 20v sec. 5 sentence 1 no. 2 BKAG governs the transfer of data for the purpose
of protecting against threats. For the most part, it satisfies constitutional requirements. However, the provision is disproportionate insofar as it generally already allows a transfer of data for the prevention of certain criminal offences.
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aa) § 20v sec. 5 sentence 1 no. 2 BKAG allows a transfer of data stemming from
measures taken pursuant to §§ 20h, 20k or 20l BKAG for the purpose of protecting
against an imminent threat to public security. With this threshold, which is directly deduced from Art. 13 sec. 4 GG, the legislature, with regard to a change in purpose,
conforms to the requirements for a hypothetical re-collection of data; also, a transfer
of information from particularly intrusive measures, including the surveillance of private homes and remote searches, is justified. While it is generally the duty of the legislature to specify the legal interests to be protected in the context of conditions for interference and to thus also flesh out the concept of public security which, while being
enshrined in Art. 13 sec. 4 GG, is described only in general terms (cf. accordingly for
Art. 14 sec. 3 GG BVerfGE 134, 242 <294 para. 177>), here such specifications can
be deduced from the regulatory context. Upon a reasonable interpretation, the concept of an imminent threat to public security must be held to mean a threat to the particularly high-ranking legal interests enumerated in §§ 20h, 20k and 20l BKAG (cf. in
this respect also BVerfGE 109, 279 <379>).
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bb) It is not objectionable either that the transfer of data collected by means of other
measures only requires a significant danger to public security. It is, first, not objectionable with regard to data obtained by means of low-threshold interferences (cf. for example §§ 20c et seq. or §§ 20q et seq. BKAG). The transfer of such data is, to be permissible, generally subject to less restrictive requirements. Furthermore, the
provision is also constitutional with regard to data from intrusive measures such as
those adopted pursuant to §§ 20g, 20j or 20m BKAG. Also here, the public security
concept is not to be interpreted as being as comprehensive as in the sense of the
general clause of police law that relates to the inviolability of the legal order […]. Instead it is given shape by the term “significant” danger. In accordance with the respective interpretation under general security law, this requires that there be a danger
to an important legal interest; this includes life, limb, freedom or the existence of the
state in particular […]. An interpretation of the provision based on the Constitution
must result in the conclusion that a precondition for the transfer of data from particularly intrusive measures is the protection of sufficiently weighty legal interests.
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cc) However, § 20v sec. 5 sentence 1 no. 2 BKAG is disproportionately broad and
thus unconstitutional insofar as it generally also allows a transfer of data for the purpose of preventing criminal offences enumerated in § 129a secs. 1 and 2 StGB. Indeed, these all constitute particularly serious criminal offences. However, given that
the Act allows the transfer in general terms for the purpose of preventing such crimi-
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