sures, which are only justified for the protection of particularly high-ranking legal interests.
Nearly all criminal offences enumerated in § 4a sec. 1 sentence 2 BKAG in conjunction with § 129a secs. 1 and 2 StGB concern crimes that are directly directed against
life or limb or – for example, as crimes endangering the general public – that draw
their wrongful nature from threats thereto, or concern property of substantial value of
value the preservation of which as essential infrastructure is in the public interest. Insofar as this is not necessarily the case with some individual crimes enumerated in
§ 129a StGB, it needs to be taken into account that § 4a sec. 1 sentences 1 and 2
BKAG determines that the prevention of such criminal offences only falls within the
Federal Criminal Police Office’s remit if the offences have a terrorist dimension that is
statutorily defined in greater detail. Thus, the factually appropriate understanding of
the provision results in the finding that information obtained through individual investigative powers must, also when resorted to for a further use pursuant to § 20v sec. 4
sentence 2 no. 1 BKAG, always serve to protect those legal interests for whose protection the collection of data was already justified, even in the case of more intrusive
measures.
300
bb) Generally, it is not objectionable either that § 20v sec. 4 sentence 2 no. 1 BKAG
allows the further use of data in general terms and thus also as a mere evidentiary basis for further investigations irrespective of specific threats or specific evidentiary
bases. Insofar as the use does not concern data stemming from the surveillance of
private homes or remote searches (see below, D II 1 b), it it still within the scope of
the purpose limitation. […] This, however, does not affect the requirement to delete
the recorded data after achieving the purpose of the data collection (see above, C VI
4 a).
301
b) § 20v sec. 4 sentence 2 no. 1 BKAG is, however, disproportionately broad insofar
as it covers all data indiscriminately and thus also covers the further use of data stemming from the surveillance of private homes and remote searches. Accordingly, the
provision allows the further use of data irrespective of whether there is an imminent
danger (cf. BVerfGE 109, 279 <377, 379>) or a risk situation that is sufficiently specific in the individual case (see above, C IV 1 b; D I 2 b bb). This is incompatible with the
constitutional prohibition of excessiveness. As far as information that stems from
such particularly intrusive surveillance measures is concerned, any use that goes beyond the original investigations requires that all conditions for interference be met
again each time and in the same way as would be necessary on constitutional
grounds in case of a re-collection of data (see above, D I 1 b).
302
2. § 20v sec. 4 sentence 2 no. 2 BKAG, on the use of data for the protection of witnesses and other persons, is also incompatible with constitutional requirements. Due
to its lack of specificity alone, the unrestricted and general reference to the duties of
the Federal Criminal Police Office under § 5 and § 6 BKAG does not satisfy the standards developed above.
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