is also needed.
Since covert surveillance measures occur largely unnoticed by persons concerned
and the public, and since the obligation to notify or the right to information can only
counteract this to a limited extent by offering the subsequent possibility of the protection of subjective rights, regular reports by the Federal Criminal Police Office to Parliament and to the public on the exercise of these powers must be required by law.
These are necessary and must be sufficiently substantial in order to facilitate a public
discussion on the nature and scope of data collected by means of these powers, including the handling of the obligations to notify or delete, and thus subject the data
collection to democratic oversight and review (cf. BVerfGE 133, 277 <372 paras. 221
and 222>).
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7. The provision of deletion requirements also belongs to the overarching proportionality requirements (cf. BVerfGE 65, 1 <46>; 133, 277 <366 para. 206>; established case-law). The purpose of these is to ensure that the use of personal data remains limited to the purposes that justified the data processing, and that the use is no
longer possible once these have been achieved or settled. The deletion of the data
must be documented in order to ensure transparency and oversight.
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V.
In various respects, the challenged police surveillance measures do not satisfy the
constitutional requirements set out above with regard to their respective conditions for
interference.
1. § 20g sec. 1 to 3 BKAG is only partially compatible with the Constitution.
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a) § 20g sec. 1 BKAG permits surveillance outside of private homes using the particular means of data collection defined in greater detail in § 20g sec. 2 BKAG. It thus
authorises the Federal Criminal Police Office to interfere with the right to informational self-determination (Art. 2 sec. 1 in conjunction with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG).
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The provision, however, does not authorise interferences with Art. 10 sec. 1 GG. In
contrast to §§ 20l, 20m BKAG, the powers listed in § 20g BKAG do not permit measures that interfere with the secrecy of telecommunications; nor do they permit measures that interfere with the right to the guarantee of the confidentiality and integrity of
information technology systems, such as the manipulation of such systems for observation purposes. The provision is not to be measured against Art. 13 sec.1 GG either.
It only authorises surveillance outside of private homes (cf. BTDrucks 16/9588, p. 23)
and thus operates on the premise that the surveillance measures undertaken pursuant to it will, as must be ensured by technical means if need be, end at the
doorstep. The powers of § 20g sec. 4 BKAG that reach beyond this are not subjectmatter of these proceedings.
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b) With regard to the weight of its interference, § 20g secs. 1 and 2 BKAG covers a
wide spectrum, also encompassing serious interferences.
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