of proprietary interests to be sufficiently weighty. However, the Court has held that access to data stored as a precaution (cf. BVerfGE 125, 260 <330>) or the surveillance
of private homes also in cases of general danger (cf. BVerfGE 109, 279 <379>), or remote searches of information technology systems [translator’s note: previous translations of the German term Onlinedurchsuchung have used “online search”; this translation uses “remote search” with the same meaning] in cases of danger to interests of
the public that affect the existence of people (cf. BVerfGE 120, 274 <328>) are generally compatible with the Constitution. Against that background, the legislature is not
hindered from uniformly establishing the relevant threshold for the protection of legal
interests with regard to these surveillance measures.
b) In the context of the protection against threats to the legal interests mentioned
above, the collection of data by means of covert surveillance measures having a high
interference intensity is generally only proportionate if there is a sufficiently specific
foreseeable danger to these legal interests in an individual case and the person targeted by these measures appears, to a reasonable person examining the objective
circumstances, to be involved therein (cf. BVerfGE 120, 274 <328 and 329>; 125,
260 <330 and 331>).
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These conditions also depend, in each case, on the type and weight of the interference. For the particularly serious interferences with privacy that the surveillance of
private homes constitutes, Art. 13 sec. 4 GG requires imminent danger. The term “imminent danger” thereby not only refers, in the sense of the qualified protection of legal
interests, to the extent, but also to the probability, of damage (cf. BVerfGE 130, 1
<32>).
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Furthermore, the requirements of a sufficiently specific foreseeable risk situation
with respect to the mentioned legal interests must be determined in relation to the
burden on the affected person. Sufficient from a constitutional perspective are the requirements for the prevention of specific, directly imminent or present threats from
persons subject to police action (polizeipflichtige Personen) according to the standards of general security law pertaining to the legally protected interests relevant
here. The traditional police law term “specific threat” requires a factual situation that in
the specific case, if left unhindered and provided that the events proceed in line with
what is objectively to be expected, will lead, in foreseeable time, and with sufficient
probability, to a violation of an interest protected by the police (cf. BVerfGE 115, 320
<364>; Decisions of the Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts – BVerwGE 116, 347 <351>). An even closer temporal link is
required when the respective legal authorisation requires a “directly imminent” or
“present threat” (cf. BVerwGE 45, 51 <57 and 58>).
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However, the legislature is not constitutionally limited at the outset to creating, in respect of each type of function, criteria for interferences that reflect the usual model in
security law of protecting against specific, directly imminent or present threats.
Rather, it can set wider limits for particular fields, in order to aim at already preventing
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