tence and the security of the Federation and of the Laender (federal states), and life,
limb and the freedom of persons are legally protected interests of significant constitutional weight. Accordingly, the Federal Constitutional Court has underlined that the
security of the state, as a constituted power of peace and order, as well as the safety of the population it is bound to guarantee – while respecting the dignity and the
intrinsic value of the individual – rank equally with other highly valued constitutional
rights. It thus considers the state to be under an obligation to protect the life, physical integrity and freedom of the individual, which also means, in particular, to protect
against unlawful interferences by others (cf. BVerfGE 115, 320 <346 and 347>; see
also BVerfGE 49, 24 <56 and 57>; 90, 145 <195>; 115, 118 <152 and 153>).
In testing appropriateness, it must also be considered that the challenged provisions
do not constitute provisions whose broad scope of interference affect the entire population equally. Rather, these are predominantly provisions aimed at enabling security
authorities to protect, in individual cases, legal interests having constitutional rank
from serious threats as well as to prevent criminal offences of great weight.
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In light of the threat posed by international terrorism, the decision to collect data is
also of particular significance for the exchange of information between domestic authorities as well as for rendering the cooperation with security authorities of other
states as effective as possible. A functioning exchange of information, which is in the
interest of the constitutionally required protection of persons, presupposes the transfer of information gathered domestically and in return relies on information from third
countries.
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IV.
For powers of investigation and surveillance constituting serious interferences with
privacy, which are predominantly in question here, the Federal Constitutional Court
has derived overarching requirements from the principle of proportionality in the strict
sense. These concern specific wide-ranging potential threats to fundamental rights, in
particular those entailed in the context of electronic processing of data (cf. BVerfGE
100, 313 <358 et seq.>; 115, 320 <341 et seq.>; 125, 260 <316 et seq.>; 133, 277
<335 et seq. para. 138 et seq.>), as well as individual case-by-case measures
against persons who are being focussed on by the acting authorities (BVerfGE 107,
299 < 312 et seq.> - Collection of telecommunications traffic data -, BVerfGE 110, 33
<52 et seq.>; 113, 348 <364 et seq.>; 129, 208 <236 et seq.> - Telecommunications
surveillance under federal, federal state and criminal procedural law -, BVerfGE 109,
279 <335 et seq.> - Surveillance of private homes -, BVerfGE 112, 304 <315 et seq.>
- GPS observation -, BVerfGE 120, 274 <302 et seq.> - Online search -).
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1. Covert surveillance measures, to the extent that they seriously interfere with privacy, as most of the measures at issue here do, are only compatible with the Constitution if they pursue the aim of protecting or legally reinforcing sufficiently weighty legal interests when these are in danger or are violated, as evidenced by strong factual
indications in the specific case. They generally require that the person targeted by the
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