CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
respect for correspondence to be transmitted abroad mechanically, even if
its intelligence value is very low. Such transmission may therefore generate
clearly disproportionate risks for Article 8 Convention rights. Furthermore,
no legally binding obligation is imposed on the FRA to analyse and
determine whether the foreign recipient of intelligence offers an acceptable
minimum level of safeguards.
372. Finally, the Inspectorate’s dual role and the absence of a possibility
for members of the public to obtain reasoned decisions in some form in
response to inquiries or complaints regarding bulk interception of
communications weakens the ex post facto control mechanism to an extent
that generates risks for the observance of the affected individuals’
fundamental rights. Moreover, the lack of an effective review at the final
stage of interception cannot be reconciled with the Court’s view that the
degree of interference with individuals’ Article 8 rights increases as the
process advances (see paragraphs 239 and 245 above) and falls short of the
requirement of “end-to-end” safeguards (see paragraph 264 above).
373. The Court is satisfied that the main features of the Swedish bulk
interception regime meet the Convention requirements on quality of the law
and considers that the operation of this regime at the time of the Chamber
examination was therefore in most aspects kept within the limits of what is
“necessary in a democratic society”. It finds, however, that the
shortcomings mentioned in the preceding paragraphs are not sufficiently
compensated by the existing safeguards and that, therefore, the Swedish
bulk interception regime oversteps the margin of appreciation left to the
authorities of the respondent State in that regard. The Court reiterates that
there is considerable potential for bulk interception to be abused in a manner
adversely affecting the rights of individuals to respect for private life (see
paragraph 261 above). Therefore, having regard to rule of law principle,
which is expressly mentioned in the Preamble to the Convention and is
inherent in the object and purpose of Article 8 (see Roman Zakharov, cited
above, § 228), the Court considers that the Swedish bulk interception
regime, when viewed as a whole, did not contain sufficient “end-to-end”
safeguards to provide adequate and effective guarantees against arbitrariness
and the risk of abuse.
(d) Conclusion on Article 8
374. Having regard to the above conclusion concerning the lawfulness
and justification of the impugned bulk interception regime, the Court finds
that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 8 of the
Convention.
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