CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
353. In these circumstances, there is no reason to doubt that Swedish law
and practice secure an effective supervision on signal intelligence activities
in Sweden. In the Court’s view, the Inspectorate’s role, coupled with the
judicial pre-authorisation procedure before the Foreign Intelligence Court,
form together a functioning safeguard against abuse at the crucial stages of
the signals intelligence process – before and during the process of
interception, analysis, use and destruction of the information obtained.
(9) Ex post facto review
354. It appears undisputed that, due to secrecy, no use has ever been
made in practice of the theoretical possibility under the Signals Intelligence
Act to notify natural persons when selectors directly related to them have
been employed (see paragraphs 58, 59, 75 in fine and 80 above).
355. In the Court’s view, it is clear that notifying affected individuals in
the context of the Swedish system of signals intelligence as part of foreign
intelligence, if at all technically possible, might have far-reaching
consequences that are difficult to foresee in advance. As already noted (see
paragraph 272 above) a remedy which does not depend on notification to
the interception subject could be an effective remedy in the context of bulk
interception. The Court therefore accepts the respondent State’s approach in
this regard as being legitimate. However, the absence of a functioning
notification mechanism should be counterbalanced by the effectiveness of
the remedies that must be available to individuals who suspect that their
communications may have been intercepted and analysed.
356. The Court notes in this regard that the Signals Intelligence Act
provides for ex post facto review on the initiative of individuals or legal
persons without them having to demonstrate that they may have been
affected by a bulk interception operation. In reaction to a request by anyone,
regardless of nationality and residence, the Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate
must investigate if the person’s communications have been intercepted
through signals intelligence and, if so, verify whether the interception and
treatment of the information have been in accordance with the law. As
already noted (see paragraph 350 above), the Inspectorate has the power to
decide that the signals intelligence operation shall cease or that the
intelligence shall be destroyed.
357. The applicant pointed out that there is no possibility for an
individual to be informed of whether his or her communications have
actually been intercepted or, generally, to be given reasoned decisions.
Under the relevant domestic law the Inspectorate informs the complainant
only that an investigation has been carried out (see paragraph 61 above).
358. It transpires from the material available to the Court (see, in
particular, paragraphs 61 and 203 above) that the Inspectorate regularly
examines the requests submitted to it by individuals.
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