CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
body to balance the necessity of transmitting intelligence abroad against the
need to protect the right to respect for private life. By comparison, the Court
notes that, for example, the relevant regime in the United Kingdom includes
an obligation to take reasonable steps to ensure that the foreign authorities
would maintain the necessary procedures to safeguard the intercepted
material and to ensure that it is disclosed, copied, distributed and retained
only to the minimum extent necessary (see paragraph 7.5 of the United
Kingdom Interception of Communications Code of Practice, quoted in Big
Brother Watch and Others, cited above, § 96).
329. It is true that in 2014 the Inspectorate undertook a general review of
the FRA’s cooperation with other States and, between 2009 and 2017,
repeatedly inspected other relevant aspects of its activities, including the
treatment of personal data and the communication of its reports (see
paragraph 53 above). However, since the Inspectorate’s role is to exercise
control for lawfulness, in the absence of an express legal obligation for the
FRA to consider privacy concerns or seek at least some safeguards in this
regard from foreign partners before sending them intelligence, it is not
unreasonable to consider, as the applicant did, that the Inspectorate does not
monitor possible risks or disproportionate consequences of intelligence
sharing on Article 8 Convention rights. The respondent Government have
failed to convince the Court that this is done in practice on the basis of, for
example, constitutional or other general fundamental rights provisions. It
follows that, unlike the Chamber, the Grand Chamber cannot accept that the
shortcomings in the regulatory framework are sufficiently counterbalanced
by the supervisory elements of the Swedish regime.
330. In sum, the absence of a requirement in the Signals Intelligence Act
or other relevant legislation that consideration be given to the privacy
interests of the individual concerned when making a decision about
intelligence sharing is a significant shortcoming of the Swedish regime, to
be taken into account in the Court’s assessment of its compatibility with
Article 8 of the Convention.
(7) The limits on the duration of interception, the storage of intercept material
and the circumstances in which such material must be erased and destroyed
331. The duration of bulk interception operations is, of course, a matter
for the domestic authorities to decide. There must, however, be adequate
safeguards, such as a clear indication in domestic law of the period after
which an interception warrant will expire, the conditions under which a
warrant can be renewed and the circumstances in which it must be cancelled
(see Roman Zakharov, cited above, § 250).
332. Under section 5(a) of the Signals Intelligence Act a permit may be
granted for a maximum of six months. This period may be extended, for six
months at a time, following a new full examination of the relevant
conditions for the granting of a permit by the Foreign Intelligence Court.