CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
capable of providing relevant enhanced protection against the arbitrary use
of selectors linked to identified individuals.
301. The Swedish system of authorisation has its inherent limits. For
example, it may be difficult for the Foreign Intelligence Court to appreciate
the proportionality aspect where only categories of selectors are specified in
the FRA’s request for a permit, or where the indicated selectors are several
thousand in number or are expressed as technical combinations of numbers
or letters.
302. However, for the purposes of the Court’s analysis, at this stage the
relevant point is that the Swedish authorisation system offers a judicial ex
ante review of permit requests which is comprehensive, in the sense that the
aim of the mission and the bearers and categories of selectors to be used are
subject to control, and is sufficiently detailed in respect of secret bulk
signals intelligence as part of foreign intelligence. Such a review offers a
significant safeguard against, notably, the launch of abusive or clearly
disproportionate bulk interception operations. Importantly, it also sets the
framework within which a concrete operation must unfold and the limits
whose observance then becomes the object of the applicable supervision and
ex post facto control mechanisms.
(5) The procedures to be followed for selecting, examining and using intercept
material
303. It transpires from the material in the Court’s possession that in
Sweden the interception of cable-based electronic signals is automated and
the interception of such signals over the airways may be either automated or
manual. Automated interception over the airways is a process that is
identical to the process of interception of signals passing through crossborder cables.
304. As regards the use of non-automated interception and searches of
electronic signals over the airways, the Swedish Government clarified
before the Grand Chamber that it is primarily used for near real-time
reporting of foreign military activities and is done by an operator who
listens in real time to military radio transmissions on selected radio
frequencies or looks at a screen where the energy from a signal in electronic
form is visualised and then records relevant parts for analysing and
reporting. The applicant did not comment in reply.
305. Even assuming that the interception of foreign military radio
frequencies may affect Article 8 rights in rare cases, the Court notes that this
aspect of the Swedish signals intelligence regime is covered by the same
procedures and safeguards as applicable to interception and use of cablebased communications.
306. Turning to the procedure for examination of the intercepted
material, the Court notes that, as explained by the respondent Government,
the FRA processes the data through automated and manual means, using,