CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
victim status under Article 34 of the Convention. Any other approach risks
rendering the access to the Convention complaints’ procedure conditional
on proving that one’s communications are of interest for agencies tasked
with foreign intelligence – an almost impossible task, having regard to the
secrecy inherent in foreign intelligence activities.
172. In these circumstances, the Court must have regard to the remedies
available in Sweden to persons who suspect that they were subjected to
measures under the Signals Intelligence Act in order to assess whether, as
maintained by the applicant, the threat of surveillance can be claimed in
itself to restrict free communication, thereby constituting for all users or
potential users a direct interference with the right guaranteed by Article 8.
173. In this regard, the Court observes that, in practice, persons affected
by bulk interception activities do not receive notification. On the other hand,
in reaction to a request by anyone, regardless of nationality and residence,
the Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate must investigate if the person’s
communications have been intercepted through signals intelligence and, if
so, verify whether the interception and treatment of the information have
been in accordance with law. The Inspectorate has the power to decide that
the signals intelligence operation shall cease or that the intelligence shall be
destroyed. Any person may also seek the involvement of the Parliamentary
Ombudsmen and the Chancellor of Justice in a number of circumstances.
174. The applicant alleged, however, that the only information that
might be given by the Inspectorate, without any reasons for the conclusions
reached and in the form of a final decision not amenable to appeal, was that
there had been an unlawful action. No other remedy could result in the
complainant obtaining additional information on the circumstances of a
possible interception and use of his or her communications or related data or
about the nature of the unlawful action, if it occurred.
175. In the context of the issue of victim status, without prejudice to the
conclusions to be drawn in respect of the substantive requirements of
Article 8 § 2 and Article 13 in the present case, the Court notes that the
domestic remedies available in Sweden to persons who suspect that they are
affected by bulk interception measures are subject to a number of
limitations. In the Court’s view, even if these limitations are to be
considered inevitable or justified, the practical result is that the availability
of remedies cannot sufficiently dispel the public’s fears related to the threat
of secret surveillance.
176. It follows that it is not necessary to examine whether the applicant,
due to its personal situation, is potentially at risk of seeing its
communications or related data intercepted and analysed.
177. On the basis of the above considerations the Court finds that an
examination of the relevant legislation in abstracto is justified. The
Government’s objection that the applicant may not claim to be the victim of
a violation of his or her Convention rights allegedly occasioned by the mere