Judgment Approved by the court for handing down
R (Bridges) v CCSWP and SSHD
use of fingerprints and DNA, that it was necessary for there to be, among other
safeguards, “detailed rules governing the scope and application of measures”
so as to provide sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness
(at [99]). The Court went on to state that (emphasis added):
“103. The protection of personal data is of
fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his
or her right to respect for private and family life, as
guaranteed by art. 8 of the Convention. The domestic
law must afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any
… use of personal data as may be inconsistent with the
guarantees of this article. The need for such safeguards
is all the greater where the protection of personal data
undergoing automatic processing is concerned, not least
when such data are used for police purposes. The
domestic law should notably ensure that such data are
relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for
which they are stored. The domestic law must also
afford adequate guarantees that retained personal data
was efficiently protected from misuse and abuse. The
above considerations are especially valid as regards the
protection of special categories of more sensitive data
and more particularly of DNA information, which
contains the person's genetic make-up of great
importance to both the person concerned and his or her
family.
104. The interests of the data subjects and the
community as a whole in protecting the personal data,
including fingerprint and DNA information, may be
outweighed by the legitimate interest in the prevention
of crime. However, the intrinsically private character of
this information calls for the Court to exercise careful
scrutiny of any State measure authorising its retention
and use by the authorities without the consent of the
person concerned.”
82.
When assessing what is required in terms of appropriate legal framework,
different types of biometric information must be evaluated on their own terms.
Facial biometric information is significant because it is a unique identifier for
a person. But the significance of this type of biometric data is qualitatively
different from, for example, DNA. A DNA sample provides access to a very
wide range of information about a person.
83.
In like manner, it is relevant to recognise that AFR Locate is not a form of
covert surveillance. “Covert surveillance” is defined in s.26(9)(a) of the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (“RIPA”), which provides
“…surveillance is covert if, and only if, it is carried out in a manner that is
calculated to ensure that persons who are subject to the surveillance are
unaware that it is or may be taking place…”. We emphasise the words
underlined. SWP accepts that were AFR to be used covertly it would be