2012 Annual Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner
10. CONCLUSION
This is my final report as Interception of Communications Commissioner covering the period
between 1st January and 31st December 2012. I stood down as Interception of Communications
Commissioner at the end of this period and am not in a position to deal with events after that
period.
I believe that it is in the public interest that public authorities should demonstrate that they
make lawful, responsible and effective use of their powers. My annual report should provide the
necessary assurance that the use which public authorities and prisons have made of their powers
under RIPA and Prison Rules respectively has met my expectations and those of my inspectors,
and that I have reported on the small number of occasions where it has not. I have increased the
level of detail in my annual reports each year to enable the public to have a better understanding
of what is overseen, how it is overseen, and the impact of independent oversight.
The use of lawful interception and communications data affords significant advantages to public
authorities when investigating crime and threats to national security. Although huge intelligence
and investigative benefits can be reaped from lawful interception and communications data,
interception and the gathering of data has the potential to be highly intrusive. That is why the
tests of necessity and proportionality outlined in RIPA and the independent scrutiny provided by
my team and others tasked with intelligence oversight are crucial.
It is my view, based on the results from the inspections that my inspectors’ and I have conducted,
that the public authorities and prisons which I oversee strive to achieve the best possible level of
compliance with RIPA and Prison Rules respectively.
I have observed, both this year and during previous years that questions concerning the legality
and the necessity and proportionality of the proposed conduct are posed at every stage of
the application and authorisation process. Through my reading of documents and my meetings
with staff involved in interception and the acquisition of communications data, I have been able
to reach the conclusion that all those involved act with integrity and in an ethical manner. The
greatest scrutiny occurs within the public authorities themselves. For example, in relation to lawful
interception, an application must cross the desks of a number of officials, sometimes including
legal advisers, and it will be scrutinised with care several times before it reaches the relevant
Secretary of State. I have observed that successive ministers of different political persuasions,
senior officials, public authority and CSP staff have all undertaken this internal scrutiny with
dedication and integrity. Similar safeguards exist in relation to the acquisition of communications
data, where the requests are vetted by a trained and accredited SPoC before being considered by
a DP, who must believe the tests of necessity and proportionality have been met. I have long been
a proponent for the SPoC process and believe it is a robust safeguard to the communications
data process.
Error reporting remains a significant component of my oversight function. It is perhaps
inevitable that some mistakes will be made, especially when public authorities are dealing with
large volumes of interception product and communications data in complex investigations.
However, I am pleased to say that the error rate is very low when compared to the volume
of communications data requests made and interception warrants in place. I am confident that
errors are generally reported on time, in full and that steps are taken to reduce the likelihood of
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