60
Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Annual Report 2019
Allegations of mistreatment
9.49
We reviewed a small number of cases where SIS was made aware of allegations of
mistreatment by a liaison partner in circumstances which engage paragraph 6 of the
Consolidated Guidance. In every case, we were satisfied that SIS conducted a full and
thorough investigation as far as was reasonably practicable. None of these cases involved
Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) making a material contribution to any mistreatment
which may have occurred. Where relevant, SIS’s investigations included an assessment as
to whether the allegations, if found to be credible, might impact on their own work with
foreign liaison partners in country.
Case study: allegations of mistreatment
In the course of a joint operation run by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) with a foreign
liaison partner, a terrorist suspect was arrested and subsequently put on trial. The suspect
was eventually acquitted and released. SIS then received the text of the court judgment,
which included reference to allegations made by the suspect that he had been subjected to
mistreatment during his time in detention.
It is not uncommon for suspects to make such allegations in the course of criminal trials as
part of their defence strategy. Nevertheless, senior SIS staff met the leadership of the foreign
liaison service shortly after SIS became aware of the allegations, pressing them to conduct a
full investigation. Under the circumstances, and taking into account the difficult political and
operational environment in which this case arose, we were satisfied that SIS had taken all
reasonable steps to investigate the allegations once they became aware of them.
Unsolicited intelligence
9.50
We reviewed a case in which SIS received intelligence, sourced from a detainee in a
particularly high-risk country, which posed questions about UKIC’s policy on the receipt of
unsolicited intelligence.22 In this case, SIS applied the UKIC policy on receipt of unsolicited
intelligence which was agreed with the FCO and the former Intelligence Services
Commissioner in 2016. This policy provides that:
• The “serious risk” threshold at which UKIC would notify Ministers if seeking to solicit
a detention, or feed in questions to a detainee, did not need to be applied in the case
of unsolicited reporting. Instead, UKIC would inform Ministers following receipt of
credible reporting leading to the knowledge or belief that a specific detainee, from
whom UKIC received unsolicited intelligence via a third party, had been subject to
unacceptable conduct.
• UKIC will consider in any case where there was specific knowledge or belief that
unacceptable conduct had taken place, whether continued receipt of the intelligence was
an encouragement of the means used to obtain it.
9.51
Having reviewed the policy in the light of this particular case, we were satisfied that this is
a legitimate interpretation of the word “believe” in para 27 of the Consolidated Guidance.
22 Paragraph 27 of the Consolidated Guidance provides that “…in the cases where personnel receive
unsolicited intelligence from a liaison service that they know or believe has originated from a detainee,
and which causes them to believe that the standards to which the detainee has been or will be subject are
unacceptable, senior personnel must be informed. In all cases where senior personnel believe the concerns
to be valid, Ministers must be notified of the concerns.”