Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Annual Report 2019
meetings and decisions and email correspondence discussing operational planning and
decision making. In many cases, we noted that legal advisors were routinely advising on
operational actions, resulting in a high standard of compliance and consistency in approach
despite SIS’s dispersed working model.
9.34
We reviewed a range of SIS’s sensitive casework and, in particular, scrutinised their
reliance on broader submissions which could be applied to multiple operations. We were
pleased to note that SIS provides thorough notes on the reliance on these submissions
to the Secretary of State and found that SIS provided full details of certain operational
acts. We judge this would enable the Secretary of State to have a full understanding of
the submission. Our review of SIS’s internal documentation for these submissions found
that the necessity, proportionality and any risks incurred in relation to planned operations
were considered and documented thoroughly on a case-by-case basis. We have suggested
to SIS that this approach should be replicated for any other similar submissions that they
act under.
9.35
SIS plays the leading role in UK intelligence work outside of the UK but increasingly
cooperates with GCHQ, MI5 and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). We have attempted
to follow through documentation for joint and collaborative operations between these
agencies, for example reviewing internal decision making at an agency working in tandem
with SIS in reliance on a section 7 authorisation. We have found that coordination
between agencies has been well structured and documentation at each agency sets
out complementary information; it is clear from external review what role each agency
is playing and what individual and joint objectives are being met. We will continue to
take this cross-cutting approach in future inspections as we believe this provides a more
comprehensive picture of operational realities.
Overseas inspections
9.36
We inspected three of SIS’s overseas stations in 2019. One of these inspections was
conducted remotely via in-person discussions with the Head of Station and video-link
conversations with members of his staff. We inspected one station where we understood
there to be frequent cooperation with the local intelligence service in relation to terrorist
activity within that country. Ahead of and during this inspection, SIS briefed us on
some issues they had working with that liaison partner, which had led to a temporary
suspension of cooperation. Prior to the inspection, SIS brought to our attention a situation
in which they were concerned that individuals detained within the country following joint
intelligence operations might be subject to unacceptable treatment. SIS drew this case
to our attention providing substantial detail, including contemporaneous documentation,
on this issue and the steps that they had taken to mitigate and resolve any risks. SIS
demonstrated a rapid response to a potentially unacceptable situation and we are
satisfied that they took all possible steps to ensure that any possible risk of harm to these
individuals was minimised. SIS also demonstrated the work that had been conducted within
their office to learn lessons from this issue. At the point of our inspection, SIS had renewed
the relationship and demonstrated a number of active safeguards for operational working.
We challenged SIS’s rationale and legal basis for continuing the relationship and were
satisfied that this was a decision that could be approved by the Foreign Secretary. Although
SIS had briefed the Foreign Secretary on the matter, we urged them to provide updated
information to the Secretary of State during any subsequent requests for approval to act
under section 7.
9.37
During 2019, SIS were required by the FCO to restrict the length of submission documents.
Although there is the option to provide additional and contextual information in an
57