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Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Annual Report 2019
9.5
Our examination of internal processes and documentation at SIS in relation to section 7
warrants, which remains the most substantial operational work under our oversight, has
shown a continued improvement in the quality and consistency of documentation. In
this area, as in previous years, we have noted that the rigour of consideration by officers
working overseas, and the advice in terms of compliance and legal discussion, is of a
high standard.
9.6
Despite the professionalism of SIS officers and prioritisation of security and welfare
arrangements for agents and covert human intelligence sources (CHIS), we have identified
several weaknesses in SIS’s CHIS handling model when conducting activity in the UK. This
has led SIS to report several errors. We expect SIS to implement any training and structural
changes necessary to ensure that internal oversight of CHIS activity is improved and that
all officers involved in agent running have an adequate understanding of the requirements
imposed by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) on activity in the UK,
which currently appears to be inconsistent. In particular, we have highlighted inconsistent
written reviews as a problem area for improvement. We made an offer for Inspectors of
the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office (IPCO) to assist in awareness training for
authorising officers, in particular, covering surveillance and CHIS under RIPA. We expect to
see a focus on this area from SIS and a considerable decline in the number of RIPA errors
reported in 2020.
Covert human intelligence sources (CHIS)
9.7
SIS conducts a minimal proportion of agent operations within the UK, or operations
affecting individuals in the UK. These operations are authorised under RIPA, unlike SIS’s
overseas operations which are conducted under the ISA. SIS’s agent running methodology
has been developed over many years and applies a high level of professionalism and care in
relation to individuals involved in gathering intelligence. However, because activities in and
touching on the UK are less common, they are also less familiar to operational staff. Overall,
although we are satisfied that SIS manages all agent cases appropriately, SIS needs to train
staff to better recognise when RIPA is engaged and to authorise activity in compliance with
the legislation. At present this continues to be an area where avoidable errors are being
caused by human oversight (see paragraph 18.8).
9.8
RIPA paperwork of SIS demonstrates inconsistent written evidence of oversight and
governance of CHIS activity by authorising officers within SIS. Reviews of RIPA CHIS
authorisations are not always carried out in accordance with the Codes of Practice
(CoP) and, whilst SIS takes agent safety very seriously, written risk assessments on these
authorisations are not always as comprehensive as they could be. SIS should institute
additional training to ensure its authorising officers are better able to evidence that they
have met their obligations under RIPA.
9.9
We have noted that SIS’s structure has led to limitations in how CHIS casework is handled
and overseen. At present, the role of a Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) is conducted by
several individuals within SIS who have responsibility for work within their business area.21
We believe that a single senior figure should have overall responsibility for these roles,
even if the work is delegated. We have suggested that this person should be of sufficient
seniority to ensure that compliance in this area is brought up to, and continues to, operate
at the required standard. SIS has since actioned this recommendation and appointed an
Assistant Director to the role.
21 The CHIS Code of Practice section 9.1 requires that each public authority appoints a Senior Responsible
Officer and lists their responsibilities.