Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Annual Report 2019
constituted interception product in response to a communications data request. While this
is concerning, we are encouraged by the proportionally negligible number of these errors,
in the context of the volume of CD requests, and the fact that the relevant police forces
immediately identified and notified us of the error, while deleting the erroneously obtained
material. We expect that the structured approach to CD requests, established through the
role of the Office for Communications Data Authorisations (OCDA), in ensuring that CD
requests are accurate and standardised, means that similar errors are unlikely in the future.
However, we are aware that a number of small TOs remain unfamiliar with the processes
and safeguards in the IPA, which means that there is a risk of similar instances happening
in future.
18.18
The two further errors were caused when police forces conducted authorised telephone
downloads and inadvertently obtained live communications content, which constitutes
interception. As described elsewhere, we are working with police and national bodies to
support work by the police to use their equipment interference powers appropriately.
Surveillance, property interference and covert human intelligence
sources (CHIS): Law enforcement agencies (LEAs), public and local
authorities, and prisons
18.19
Errors continue proactively to be reported by the authorities we oversee, with only
6 errors in this category being discovered during LEA inspections in 2019. We judge
that this indicates that error reporting is an open and transparent process embraced by
authorities, and that the process set out in section 235(6) of the IPA is working well. The
number of errors, in proportion to the number of authorisations and renewals granted in
2019, continues to be low. As in previous years, our investigations have not identified any
authority to have systemic failings in their application of the legislation and guidance for
the use of covert investigative techniques. We did not see the repetition of similar errors
which would otherwise suggest that processes across various authorities are inadequate.
None of these errors when examined were found to constitute a serious error as defined
under section 231 of the IPA, in that no significant prejudice or serious harm was suffered
by any individual as a result of those errors
Table 3: Total surveillance, property interference, covert human intelligence
sources (CHIS) and equipment interference errors for law enforcement
agencies (LEAs), public and local authorities and prisons for 2019
Investigatory Power
Number of Errors
Directed Surveillance
66
Property Interference
9
Intrusive Surveillance
4
CHIS (including undercover officers)
9
Equipment interference
8
Law enforcement
18.20
In 2019, 85 errors relating to surveillance, property interference, CHIS and equipment
interference were reported by LEAs. The number of errors is consistent with that reported
last year, with the vast proportion relating to the powers associated with directed
surveillance and observation activities going beyond that which was authorised. As detailed
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